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CHAPTER I
The Effects of Hospital Consolidation on Labor Market Outcomes
1.1 Introduction
A well-documented “merger wave” occurred in the hospital sector during the 1990s and early 2000s.
These mergers received a lot of attention from economists, policy makers, and antitrust authorities. There
now appears to be a new wave on the horizon. From 2009 to 2012, the number of annual hospital mergers
more than doubled, from 50 to 105 (New York Times, 2013). Congressman Jim McDermott recently asked
the U.S. Government Accountability Office to investigate the effects of hospital mergers as he is worried that
hospitals are starting to resemble the consolidated banks that were once “too big to fail.”
While hospitals tout increased efficiency and decreasing costs as a reason for the mergers, policy analysts
and antitrust authorities worry that the decrease in competition could result in higher prices for consumers.1
These potential price effects have been studied extensively in the literature. In contrast, in this chapter, I am
interested in the labor market consequences of consolidation, where consolidation can be one of two types:
hospital mergers or hospital system-joinings. Given the importance of hospitals to local labor markets, the
effect of consolidation on labor market outcomes could be significant. According to the American Hospital
Association, hospitals employed over 5.4 million people in 2011, making them the second largest source
of private sector jobs behind restaurants. In fact, Kaiser Permanente, New York City and Health, and
Advocate Health Care are the largest non-government employers for all workers in Los Angeles, New York,
and Chicago, respectively. Moreover, hospitals employ specialized labor. Researchers have long argued that
nurses, in particular, may be subject to monopsony power (Hurd, 1973; Sullivan, 1989; Staiger et al., 2010)
I am grateful to Francine Lafontaine, Thomas C. Buchmueller, Kevin Stange, Yesim Orhun, Jagadeesh Sivadasan, Roger D.
Blair, Achyuta Adhvaryu, and Kyle Handley for advice and suggestions, and to Daniel Bravo, Tanya Byker, Anne Fitzpatrick,
Desmond Toohey, and seminar participants at the University of Michigan for helpful comments. Finally, I would like to thank
David Dranove and Richard Lindrooth for generously sharing their data and Jean Roth of the National Bureau of Economic
Research for invaluable assistance obtaining the American Hospital Association data.
1For a review of the hospital merger literature, see Vogt and Town (2006).
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because some research suggests they are relatively immobile (Kovener et al., 2011; Rosenberg et al., 2011)
and because hospital jobs are different in terms of caseloads and tasks from other nursing jobs. Thus, some
have argued that hospital mergers could have significant effects on labor markets, especially the market for
nurses.
In this chapter, I use data from the American Hospital Association’s Annual Survey (AHA) and the
National Sample Survey of Registered Nurses (NSSRN) to create a unique panel data set covering the years
1983-2009. I use a difference-in-differences approach and propensity-score weighting to correct for selection
bias, and examine changes in employment levels and wages of registered nurses (RNs) and licensed practical
nurses (LPNs) before and after a hospital consolidation. I also conduct a “rival” analysis similar to Woolley
(1989), Connor and Feldman (1998), and Dafny (2009), where I look for effects on the subsample of hospitals
that never merge but are exposed to a merger.
This chapter contributes to the literature in four main ways. First, while there is a large literature on
hospital mergers, these studies focus on merger impacts on prices, costs, and patient outcomes (Connor
and Feldman, 1998; Ho and Hamilton, 2000; Dranove and Lindrooth, 2003; Town et al., 2006; Dafny, 2009;
Harrison, 2010; Hass-Wilson and Garmon, 2011; Hayford, 2011; Gaynor et al, 2012; Patel, 2013). They
find mixed results. In fact, very few studies have examined the effects of mergers, or any takeover, on labor
market outcomes (Brown and Medoff, 1988; McGuckin and Nguyen, 2001; Li, 2012). To the best of my
knowledge, no study of hospital mergers has ever focused directly on the potential employment and wage
effects.
Second, I allow estimates of the effects to differ by mergers and system-joinings. Thus far, the hospital
consolidation literature has largely ignored the potential effects of system-joinings (Cueller and Gertler
(2005) and Melnick and Keeler (2007) are exceptions). System-joinings differ from mergers in that they
do not result in a full merging of assets or a shared license. Hospitals that join a system share a common
governing owner but continue to operate under separate licenses. These system-joinings can involve as
little as simply becoming part of a “brand” or as much as a full change in the governing owners. While
wage decisions and union bargaining happen at the hospital level even after joining a system, it is plausible
that system-joinings could impact employment through either decreased competition in the labor market or
efficiency gains from shared knowledge or facilities.
Third, I contribute to the literature on monopsony power (or buying power) in general, and in the market
for nurses specifically (Link and Landon, 1975; Sullivan, 1989; Hirsch and Schumacher, 1995; Staiger et al.,
2010; Matsudaira, 2013). To identify potential reasons for hospital consolidation, I examine how wages of
registered nurses and licensed practical nurses change after a hospital merger or a system-joining. If, from a
labor perspective, decreased competition for labor is the dominant effect of consolidation then wages should
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decrease as a result of the increased buying power of the hospitals; if efficiency gains are the dominant effect
due to consolidation, as the hospitals contend they are, then wages should be unaffected.
Fourth, and finally, the length of the period covered by the data I have gathered allows for a detailed
analysis of both the short-term and long-term effects on local labor market outcomes.
I find that RN employment decreases by an average of 16% after a merger and that this effect persists
five years after a merger. I find that LPN employment also substantially decreases even more following a
merger, falling 24% on average. These results appear to be driven by efficiency gains rather than an increase
in buying/monopsony power, as average hospital payroll per worker does not decrease.2 In addition, the
ratio of nurses to admissions either stays the same or decreases. I corroborate that the results are driven by
efficiency gains by examining rival hospitals that are exposed to a hospital merger. If hospitals that merge
are exploiting an increase in buying power, then hospitals in the same labor market should also be able
to exploit the increase in market concentration. While I find some reductions in employment of RNs and
LPNs at rival hospitals, these effects do not appear until 12 years and 14 years, repectively, after the merger
occurs. These results at long horizons appear to confirm that the employment effects of a merger are driven
by efficiency gains and not an increase in monopsony power as they are likely due to unobserved variations
in the market that are unrelated to the merger.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the effects of system-joinings on employment levels are much smaller. System-
joinings result in a small initial decrease in both RN and LPN employment, but this effect disappears after
three years. In fact, the number of LPNs increases in the long-run. I find little to no effect on hospital wages
in the period after a system-joining, also implying the initial employment decreases represent efficiency gains
rather than increased buying power. Thus, it appears that while joining a hospital system may result in
some early efficiency gains from labor reductions, they are much smaller and more temporary than those
associated with hospital mergers. Of course, there may be other benefits from system-joinings, such as an
increase in profit or financial stability.
The chapter is organized as follows. I discuss the theoretical framework in Section 1.2, and describe the
data in Section 1.3. I explain my empirical model and present my results in Section 1.4. Finally, Section 1.5
offers some concluding remarks.
2The wage results presented here are only average hospital payroll per worker. That is, in using the AHA data, I do not
observe the extent of the true change in nurses’ wages. To deal with this limitation, I supplement my wage data with the
National Sample Survey of Registered Nurses and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Occupational Employment and Wage
Estimates. I discuss this data in further detail in Section 1.3.3.
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1.2 Theoretical Framework
My theoretical framework identifies the causes of employment effects, if any, following a hospital con-
solidation. There are two reasons to expect employment effects following consolidation. First, increases
in efficiency resulting from consolidation may require that hospitals reduce labor. Second, an increase in
monopsony power due to a consolidation can also give rise to reductions in labor. Note that the effects of
the two forms of consolidation, mergers and system-joinings, may differ depending on the extent to which
they lead to monopsony power in the labor market or give rise to efficiency.
When two hospitals merge, they come together to operate under a shared license. This is a form of
horizontal integration. The efficiency benefits from doing so can include eliminating duplicate patient care
departments or simply consolidating administrative or legal staff. Interviews with industry insiders indicate
that system-joinings may allow for similar forms of efficiency gains depending on the location of the two
hospitals. In other words, joining a system can mimic the effects of a merger if two hospitals are located in
the same labor market.3
Even though system-joining does not result in a shared license, it is plausible that we could see similar
employment effects of mergers and system-joinings. For example, two hospitals in the same market that are
in the same system may be less likely to compete over workers than two hospitals that are not in the same
system. In addition, two hospitals in the same system that are located close to each other may benefit from
administrative efficiencies or the ability to allocate patients more efficiently across hospitals.
1.2.1 Increase in Monopsony Power
The consolidation of two hospitals may cause a change in competition in the labor market, especially the
market for specialized labor. In particular, a merger may increase the bargaining power of the employer and
thus allow them to reduce worker wages. If a hospital is in an imperfectly competitive labor market, it faces
an upward-sloping labor supply curve. A merger resulting in increased buying (or monopsony) power on the
part of the hospitals would lead the merged hospital to restrict employment below the competitive level and
pay wages below the marginal revenue product of the employee (see the Appendix, Section 1.6.1). Thus, we
would expect to see decreases in employment and wages at the newly consolidated hospital.
Furthermore, suppose there are labor-market effects at consolidating hospitals, and these effects are due
to a decrease in employment competition on the demand side. There should also be employment effects at
the hospitals in the same labor market that do not partake in any form of hospital consolidation. This is
3The same would be true for potential effects of system-joinings on increased prices if hospitals are in the same product
market. In fact the two studies that do examine system-joinings, Cueller and Gertler (2005) and Melnick and Keeler (2007),
find higher prices and an increase in market power of system-affiliated hospitals versus non-system hospitals.
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because the consolidation affects the competitiveness of the entire labor market, not just for hospitals that
consolidate.4 The other hospitals in the market, particularly those located most closely to the consolidating
hospital, should also see an increase in their buying power. The expectation, therefore, is that rival hospitals
in the same labor market as the consolidating hospital will also see a decrease in employment and wages if
consolidation results in an increase in monopsony power.
Testable Implication 1: If a hospital merger or system-joining results in a decrease in competition in the
nursing labor market, then all else equal, average market wage and number of nurses at the consolidating
hospital will decrease. In addition, there should be a decrease in the number of employees and wages at
non-consolidating local, i.e. rival, hospitals.
1.2.2 Efficiency Gains
Hospital consolidation may also lead to increased efficiencies. When a hospital consolidates, scale
economies may be realized. For example, consider a merger between two hospitals in the same local health
care market. These hospitals may be able to do one or more of the following: close down an under-utilized
department that is present in both hospitals pre-merger; share administrative personnel or legal staff; share
technologies that decrease demand for certain types of labor. A hospital that joins a system may also be
able to enjoy these efficiencies, but perhaps less so to the extent that having a separate license creates a
barrier to horizontal integration.
In the case of an increase in efficiency, we would expect wages to stay the same because nothing has
happened in the labor market, so the competitive wage is unaffected.5 There is also a possibility that wages
could increase if the efficiency gains result in the hospital being more profitable. If this increase in profit
is associated with an increase in the marginal product of labor (MPL), then wages may rise as employees’
wages are adjusted to this higher MPL. Alternatively, employees acting collectively, or a labor union, may
be able to successfully bargain for a share of the higher profit generated post merger or system-joining.6
Testable Implication 2: If a hospital merger or system-joining results in increased efficiencies, the number
of employees should decrease or output should increase. If a hospital merger or system-joining results in
4E.g. Dafny (2009) finds an increase in prices at rival hospitals.
5It is important to note that this framework assumes a flat supply curve of labor. If the supply curve is upward sloping, and
an increase in efficiency leads to a decrease in demand for labor, the competitive wage would decrease.
6Unfortunately, this is not something I can measure as I do not have data on unionization at the hospital level. This is
necessary since nurse bargaining occurs at the hospital level, that is, a union bargains over wages with a specific hospital,
even after a hospital has joined a hospital system. For instance if two hospitals join a larger hospital system, say Kaiser, the
bargaining over wages does not happen with Kaiser as a whole, it stays at the individual hospital.
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increased efficiencies, assuming flat supply, then wages should stay the same. If the source of efficiencies
(e.g. a positive change in capital intensity) further enhance MPL, wages might go up. Finally, rival hospitals
should see no change in number of employees or wages.
1.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The main dataset used in this chapter is the American Hospital Association’s (AHA) Annual Survey of
Hospitals (1983-2009). I supplement the wage information in the AHA data with data from the National
Sample Survey of Registered Nurses (NSSRN) (1984-2004) and the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Occupational
Employment and Wage Estimates (1997-2009).
1.3.1 The American Hospital Association’s Annual Survey of Hospitals
The AHA annual survey provides data for 98% of US hospitals, including location, ownership status,
employment levels for certain occupations, operating costs, number of beds, admissions, and information on
hospital system affiliation. The full sample of hospitals for the years 1983-2009 contains 176,596 hospital-year
observations. I restrict the sample to those hospitals that are classified as “general medical and surgical,”
thus leaving out psychiatric hospitals and other specialty centers that might compete for a different type of
employee or have a different propensity to merge or join a system. This reduces the sample to 7,149 hospitals
and 143,057 hospital-year observations.
The AHA’s annual survey also provides a “summary of changes.” Included in this summary of changes
are notes concerning hospital mergers and a classification of each merger, i.e. two or more hospitals that
merge to form a new hospital or one or more hospitals that merge into an existing hospital. The AHA tracks
hospitals that merge as a single entity after mergers, that the two separate hospital share a single ID and
appear as one hospital after the merger. The AHA merger data used in Dranove and Lindrooth (2003) was
generously provided by the authors. I use the AHA information to expand on those data, which covered
1989-1997, and identify all mergers from 1983-2009.
I use the definition of the AHA when identifying mergers and system-joinings. A hospital merger,
as defined by the AHA, is when there is a “full-asset merger” and two separate hospitals come together
to operate under a shared license. For example, in 1996, Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital and Lutheran
Community Hospital in Norfolk, Nebraska merged to form Faith Regional Health Services. Both of the
original hospitals gave up their separate hospital licenses and began to operate under the same new license.
Previous research has shown that hospitals located within 0.3 mi of each other are almost three times as
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likely to merge as hospitals that are further away from each other (Dafny, 2009). This close proximity
of merging hospitals makes it easy for a hospital to condense duplicate and unnecessary operations and
reallocate resources as needed.
When a hospital joins a system it retains its license although governing ownership may be transferred to
a new governing body. It is important to note that a system-joining that results in full ownership transfer
must be reported to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and is subject to review. No other type of system-
joining needs to be reported. Still, they may be subject to antitrust scrutiny under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act.7
While a hospital merger always implies a complete consolidation of hospital assets, joining a hospital
system can be as weak as only adopting the “brand name” of the system or as strong as a full ownership
conversion. The latter may be blocked by the FTC. For example, in 2012, the FTC prevented St. Luke’s
from joining the Promedica Hospital System. Even though it was not a traditional “full-asset merger,” St.
Luke’s intended to turn their entire ownership over to Promedica.
Each type of consolidation may allow for a hospital to combine certain aspects of their operations. Both
the acquiring and acquired hospital can benefit from consolidation. Hospitals that either join a system or
merge are typically in dire financial straits pre-consolidation and are rescued from financial catastrophe. I
show this in the Appendix, Section 1.6.2. I use cost per bed as a proxy for financial distress, and perform a
probit analysis showing that hospitals that are targeted for either type of consolidation have a higher cost per
bed, statistically significant at the 1% level (Table 1.11). Presumably, and according to industry insiders, the
targeting hospital or existing system sees the poorly-run hospital as an opportunity to restructure, refurbish,
and turn a profit.
Figure 1.1 shows that there were 637 mergers between 1983 and 2009, with a peak of 65 mergers in 1997.
The total number of observations for hospitals that merged at some time in the data period is 14,617. Given
that I will examine certain outcomes before and after a merger, I further restrict the analysis to those that
I can see at least five years before and five years after merging. This leaves a final sample of at 11,846
hospital-years for most of my analyses of hospitals involved in a merger.
As for system-joinings, Figure 1.1 also shows that there were 5,449 of these between 1986 and 2009, with
a peak of 520 system-joinings in 1989. Note that the AHA did not start collecting information on hospital
systems until 1985. While some hospitals may have joined a system in 1985, it is unclear from the data if
they were in a system in 1984. Therefore, when analyzing hospital systems, I focus on the years 1986-2009.
As with hospital mergers, I restrict the analyses to those system-joiners that I can see at least five years
before and five years after consolidation. The final sample of hospitals that join a system is 15,270.
7This information is from conversations with individuals from the FTC.
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For hospitals that consolidate, I sum the data for the years prior to consolidation. For example, if hospitals
A and B merge to form hospital C, I attach all observations to hospital ‘C’ and sum up the data for A and
B prior to the merger. I similarly sum within systems in the same labor market (the “Component Economic
Area”, described immediately below) for all system-joinings.8 In addition, I deal with multiple mergers and
multiple hospital system-joinings (a very small subset of hospitals) by creating duplicate observations for
those that consolidate multiple times. For instance, if a hospital merges in both 1992 and 1999, then it is
combined with the other hospital and is in the dataset twice, appearing in the pre-merger period in the years
leading up to 1992 as well as the years up to 1999.
1.3.2 Market definition
As my focus is on labor outcomes, I define markets using the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Component
Economic Area (CEA). Each CEA consists of one or more metropolitan areas that serve as centers of
economic activity, known as “nodes,” and the surrounding counties that are economically related to each node
(Johnson, 1995). Commuting patterns are the main factor used in determining the appropriate relationships
among surrounding counties. CEAs, therefore, are meant to include workers’ places of work and places of
residence. Given that the CEA is based on commuting patterns workers are more likely to be mobile within
a CEA than across them. Thus, it makes sense to define the labor market in which a hospital competes as
the CEA.
There are 348 CEAs in the US, of very different sizes, with a median population of 286,415 and a mean
population of 1.4 million. The number of hospitals in the AHA data in a CEA varies from 1 to 1400. CEA
definitions are obtained from the Federal Communications Commission’s website. Publicly-available U.S.
census data, obtained using the American Fact Finder tool on census.gov, provides information on market
population.
The hospital market concentration is measured using the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI). The HHI
is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the
resulting numbers. In this chapter, market share is calculated as the ratio of total beds in a hospital to
total beds in the market. This is a commonly-accepted way of calculating hospital market share (Link and
Landon (1975) and Kessler and McClellan (2005)).9 I count hospitals in the same market that are in the same
system as one hospital for the purposes of this calculation (see also Dranove, et al. (1992)). Table 1.1 shows
that market concentration is slightly higher for the markets where hospitals that merge or join a system
are located, but not markedly different from that of other hospitals. By definition, market concentration
8Summary statistics for system-joinings, however, are reported at the hospital level, not at the system consolidation level.
9I also calculate the HHI based on hospital admissions and it is highly correlated with the HHI based on beds. All results
are robust to using this alternative definition of HHI.
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also increases after both types of consolidation (Table 1.2), confirming that most system-joinings, like most
mergers, tend to occur among hospitals in the same market.
1.3.3 Wage data
In the AHA survey, hospital administrators are asked to report all hospital and facility personnel who
are on the payroll at the end of the reporting period, as well as total payroll expenses. Dividing total payroll
expenses by total facility personnel yields an average salary, or payroll per worker, for hospital personnel.10
Average hospital payroll is used as a proxy for nurses’ wage at the hospital. Clearly, this measure captures
more than nurses’ wage. If either the composition of labor changes or the wages of other hospital personnel
move in the opposite direction relative to nurses’ wage post-consolidation, the wage changes experienced by
RN and LPNs will be incorrectly measured. For example, suppose that after a hospital consolidation, the
wages of RNs and LPNs decrease, while the wages of other hospital personnel increase. I will only observe
the net change in average hospital payroll per worker and will not observe the extent of the true change in
RN and LPN wages. To deal with this limitation, I supplement my wage data with the National Sample
Survey of Registered Nurses (NSSRN) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Occupational Employment
and Wage Estimates.
The NSSRN is a survey administered by the United States Department of Health and Human Services
approximately every 4 years to RNs working in the U.S. Information on base salaries, bonuses, county where
employed, job responsibilities, education and demographics of RNs is collected. Selected from the licensure
lists in each state, the goal is to sample and estimate the characteristics of the registered nurses in the
country. Each survey consists of about 1-2% of all RNs in the U.S. While some RNs are surveyed in multiple
years, there are no unique identifiers across survey years, so there is no way to match their data over time.
RN hourly wages from this data source are constructed using total yearly salary (including bonuses but
not benefits), hours worked per week, and number of weeks worked in a year. All wages are adjusted to 2004
dollars. Unfortunately, detailed demographic information is unavailable in the survey for privacy reasons.
Instead, the data are broken down by demographic “group.” Specifically, there are 10 age groups (less than
25, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39,...greater than 65). Assuming a minimum working age of 18 and a maximum age
of 70, I take age to be the median of each of these groups. There are only two categories for race, namely
“white” and “other,” and education is stated by type of degree completed. I limit the sample to those nurses
who work in a hospital and I remove observations where information is missing on key variables (salary, hours
10While the American Hospital Association provides information about the number of physicians employed by the hospital,
these numbers are not reported in a uniform way: some hospitals choose to report only those physicians employed by the
hospital and others report those that have admitting privileges at the hospital. Therefore, I restrict my analysis to RNs and
LPNs.
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worked, demographic control variables), leaving 109,575 observations. Summary statistics are presented in
Table 1.2. While the sample analyzed is limited to those nurses who work in a hospital, summary statistcs
for nurses who work in nursing homes and doctors’ offices are also displayed for comparative purposes. This
table shows that hospital nurses look quite different than those who work in nursing homes and doctors’
offices. They earn a higher hourly wage and tend to be more educated. Additionally, 92% of hospital nurses
report being involved in direct patient care while only 9% of nurses working in doctors’ offices report the
same. Mean comparison tests of hospital RNs with nursing home and doctor’s office RNs show that the
means of wage, education, race, direct patient care, percent of time spent on patient care, whether the nurse
works full-time, and hours worked are all statistically different. Additionally, the data shows that the vast
majority of nurses work in a hospital (approximately 80%).
A third source of wage data that I use is the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Occupational Employment
and Wage Estimates. The Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates are put together through a mail
survey of non-farm establishments. The sample is derived from the list of establishments maintained by
State Workforce Agencies (SWAs) and is selected to provide an accurate representation of establishments
from every metropolitan and nonmetropolitan area in every state, across all surveyed industries, and from
establishments of different sizes. I have annual wage data at the market level for the years 1997-2009. Not
every market is represented each year, so this is an unbalanced panel of market-level wages. Summary
statistics for the wage data are presented in Table 1.3. The mean hourly wage of a registered nurse is $24.19
and this wage ranges anywhere from $7.68 to $53.38. The average registered nurse employment in an MSA
is about 5,852 RNs.
The average yearly wage from these two data sources is quite a bit higher than the average hospital wage
from the AHA. If we assume that a worker works about 2000 hours per year, than the NSSRN and BLS
yearly salaries are approximately, $50,000 and $48,000, respectively. This is larger than the average hospital
wage in the AHA of $29,000. Thus, the need for the alternative wage analyses and the NSSRN and BLS
provide better proxies of the average wage of a registered nurse.
1.3.4 Dependent Variables
Summary statistics for hospitals that merged, those that joined a system, and all other hospitals are
presented in Table 1.1. These statistics include all hospital observations, not just those observed five years
before and after consolidation. Hospitals are larger and supply many more RNs and LPNs on average than
those that do not. This higher observed employment level for hospitals that have merged are aggregated
together for the purposes of these analyses. A more comparable mean is the employment to output ratio,
which adjusts for the relative size of the hospital. RNs per admission and LPNs per admission are significantly
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lower for consolidating hospitals than for those that do not merge or join a system. This suggests that
consolidating hospitals are allocating their employment differently from those that do not consolidate. In
addition, organizational type, i.e. the proportion of not-for-profit, for-profit, and government-owned, are
different between hospitals that merge or join a system and hospitals that do not partake in either form of
consolidation. Almost 65% of hospitals that merge are not-for-profit hospitals, whereas only 41% of hospitals
that join a system and 49% percent of hospitals that do neither are not-for-profit. The opposite is true for
system-joinings, where hospitals that do change ownership are more likely to transition to for-profit following
the system-joining.
Table 1.4 shows the outcome variables of interest five years before, one year before, one year after, and
five years after both a merger and a system-joining. On average, there is a small increase in number of
RNs and a moderate decrease in number of LPNs the year after a merger in comparison to the year before
although when looking at five years before and after it appears that RNs are in decline before a merger
and then increasing after. This is in contrast to system-joinings which are associated with a large decrease
in the number of both RNs and LPNs one year after a merger, and these levels increase slightly 5 years
after. Admissions decrease very slightly one year after a merger, but increase by almost 6 thousand when
looking 5 years after a merger. System-joinings, however, see their decrease in admissions persist 5 years
after. Payroll per worker increases a small amount after merging and slightly decreases after system-joining.
Organizational type shifts a small amount for mergers indicating that some hospitals go from either being
for-profit or government-owned to not-for-profit after system-joining. System-joinings experience a much
bigger shuﬄing in organizational type, reflecting the recent trend of hospitals shifting from not-for-profit to
for-profit (Selvam, 2012).
1.4 Empirical Analyses
To estimate the effects of hospital consolidation on employment outcomes, I use a difference-in-differences
analysis, one for each type of hospital consolidation. Of course consolidation is not a random event, so I need
to correct for selection. I deal with selection in the following ways. First, I conduct a difference-in-differences
analysis and include a variety of control variables that are expected to affect the decision to consolidate as well
as the outcome variable of interest. Second, I explore the short-term and long-term effects of the mergers and
system-joinings both to see if changes immediately follow consolidation and if they persist, while controlling
for the same set of factors included in the difference-in-differences estimation. Third, I model the probability
of participating in hospital consolidation using observable hospital and market characteristics, and then use
propensity score weighting to control for the propensity to consolidate. Fourth, and finally, I examine the
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effect on rival hospitals: as described in Section 1.2, if the merged hospitals have increased market power in
the labor market, rivals should also benefit from the merger.11 For the rival hospitals, exposure to a merger
is more likely to be an exogenous event.
1.4.1 Difference-in-Differences Analysis: Mergers Only
In this section, as in the prior literature, I focus on the effects of hospital mergers only and compare them
to hospitals that do not merge (Alexander et al., 1996; Hass-Wilson and Garmon, 2011). In other words, I
ignore the possibility of joining systems in these analyses. Taking the hospital-year as the unit of observation,
I restrict my sample to observations for hospitals that never merge, along with those that I observe at least
five years prior and five years after their merger. I estimate the following difference-in-differences model as
my main specification:
ln(Yit) = θAfterMit + βXit + µi + τt + it (1.1)
where AfterMit equals one for periods after the merger for hospitals that merge.12
In equation (1), ln (Yit) represents the natural log of eight possible outcome variables of interest for
hospital i in year t : the number of registered nurses (RNs), the number of licensed practical nurses (LPNs),
the sum of the number of RNs and LPNs, the log number of admissions, the ratio of each of these employment
outcome to number of admissions, and payroll per worker. From sectoin 2, whether efficiency or monopsony,
theta is expected to be negative for the first six outcomes. For payroll per worker, however, if monopsonistic
exploitation is present then theta will be negative as well.
I include (consolidated) hospital fixed effects, µi and year fixed effects, τt. I also include a vector of
time-varying hospital and market control variables (Xit) that are expected to be related to the propensity
to merge. These variables are:
Cost per bed:
This is a measure of financial distress. It is believed that hospitals that are most likely to want to
consolidate and that are targeted for consolidation are in poor financial straits prior to merging and/or
joining a system. Since I do not have data on hospital revenue, I cannot calculate hospital profit. I
can, however, look at the ratio of costs to beds as a proxy for financial distress. Hospitals that are
less financially sound should have higher cost per bed as they are using their resources less effectively.
As shown in Table 1.1 and in Section 1.3, hospitals are more likely to consolidate with higher cost per
11This analysis is limited to mergers because there are not enough hospitals that are exposed to only one system-joining.
Almost all markets experience more than one system-joining over the sample period.
12Recall that characteristics of merging hospitals are aggregated in the periods before and after the merger. The data,
therefore, is at the consolidation-year level.
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bed.
Ownership type (i.e. for-profit, not-for-profit, or government):
Hospitals with different ownership types have may have different objective functions (Newhouse, 1970).
For-profit hospitals answer to shareholders who are looking to make money while not-for-profit hospitals
are required to reinvest their profits in the hospital. I want to make sure, therefore, that I am comparing
hospitals with similar incentives.
Current system membership:
Although we see in Section 1.3 that joining a system does not preclude merging and vice versa, we
may think that those that choose to do both are different from those that do not.
Market population:
Prior research has shown that merging hospitals are more likely to be in urban areas (Patel, 2013).
Number of hospitals in the same zip code:
Dafny (2009) shows that hospitals that are located closer to each other are more likely to merge.
Specifically, most hospitals that merge are located within 0.3 miles (as the crow flies) of each other.
Unfortunately, I do not have exact distances among hospitals, but I do know how many hospitals are
located within the same zip code. I would expect that having more hospitals within the same zip code
makes a hospital more likely to merge.
Table 1.5 column (1) displays the results of estimating equation (1) for the different outcomes of interest.
I only show the parameter for AfterMit, so each cell of column (1) represents a separate regression. Below
each estimate is its standard error clustered at the hospital level. The results show that those hospitals that
merge see a 22.6% decrease in number of Registered Nurses (RNs) following a merger, when compared to
all other hospitals. This result is even larger when looking at the effect on the number of Licensed Practical
Nurses (LPNs) as the employment level falls 28.7% following a merger. These results are significant at the
1% level. The number of admissions falls by 22.5% following a hospital merger, and accordingly, the ratio
of RNs to admissions does not change. The ratio of LPNs to admissions does fall, however. The average
wage at a hospital also increases in the post-merger period, but the effect is not statistically or economically
significant.
Consistent with the theoretical framework in Section 1.2, the wage result is evidence that the decrease
in employment is due to gains in efficiency from the merger rather than an increase in monopsony power.
Additionally, given that admissions are decreasing following a merger and the number of RNs per admission
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is staying constant, there is less of a concern that this decrease in employment will negatively affect the
quality of care at the hospital.
1.4.2 Difference-in-Differences Analysis: Mergers and System-Joinings
I am also interested in studying system-joinings and directly comparing their effects to mergers. To
examine the effects of both mergers and systems, I estimate the following equation:
ln(Yit) = θ1AfterMit + θ2AfterSit + βXit + µi + τt + it (1.2)
where AfterSit is equal to one in the periods after the system-joining. Like before, AfterMit is equal to one
in the periods after the merger occurs. Note that because I am interested in the changes for systems as well,
the sample is restricted to those hospitals that I observe at least five years prior and five years after their
system-joining or merger, and all observations of those hospitals that never merge or join a system. I also
include the same set of control variables as in equation (1) and again cluster standard errors at the hospital
level.
The second and third columns of Table 1.5, present the results from estimating equation (2). The coeffi-
cients for mergers are slightly smaller in magnitude but largely similar, including the decrease in admissions
and the zero wage effect. As for systems, we see that the coefficients are markedly different from those
for mergers: all the coefficients are either highly insignificant or positive. These results show no effect of
system-joinings on employment and a small effect on the ratio of RNs and LPNs to admissions. The positive
and significant coefficient on each of these ratios suggests that while the number of RNs may be decreasing,
the number available for each patient case the hospital addresses is actually increasing. Again, similar to the
results in column (1), these results indicate that the decrease in employment may not result in a decrease in
quality of care. A t-test for the difference in coefficients (not shown) of mergers and systems shows statisti-
cally significant differences at the 1% level for all coefficients. In other words, merging and system-joining
result in very different employment effects.
1.4.3 Event Study
My main specifications will not allow me to see if changes in the outcome variable are slow moving or
a sharp change at the time of the event. To examine this in greater detail, I estimate a model of separate
treatment effects for years before and after a merger and a system-joining (Jacobson et al., 1993). Specifically,
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I estimate
ln(Yit) = δMergeit +
5∑
i=−5
Mitθ + βXit + µi + τt + it (1.3)
whereMit are a set of dummy variables indicating each hospital’s relative timing to a merger, where i ranges
from five years before to five years after a hospital merger. The omitted category is the year before the event.
I then estimate a similar equation but, again, examine the effects of both mergers and system-joinings.
ln(Yit) = δ1Mergeit + δ2Systemit +
5∑
i=−5
Mitθi +
5∑
i=−5
Sitλi + βXmt + µi + τt + it (1.4)
After estimating equation (4), I test whether the coefficients are statistically different between those hospitals
that merge and those that do no merge.
The results are presented graphically in Figures 1.2-1.4.13 As before, all outcomes are measured in logs
and these outcomes are depicted on the y-axes. In all figures, the x-axis represents the time relative to
the event of merging or system-joining. The 95% confidence intervals are displayed above and below each
coefficient line.
Figure 1.2 shows the different employment outcomes in relation to the timing of mergers. We see that for
both RNs and LPNs, there is no effect pre-merger, yet a strong negative trend in number of RNs and LPNs
after the merger. Both the number of RNs and the number of LPNs are continuing to trend downward even
six years post-merger. We also see a large drop in the number of RNs and LPNs immediately at the time
of the merger. It is important to keep in mind that these are hospitals that do not close after the merger.
While I cannot see if a hospital ultimately closes a few years later, I am able to identify if the hospital closes
at the time of the merger. These decreases in employment, therefore, are not the result of an immediate
hospital closure.
As in the results in Section 1.4.1, there is a large decrease in admissions and there is no significant change
in the ratio of RNs to admissions in the years following a merger. Therefore, while there is a clear decrease
in RN employment, output per worker is continuing to rise. We do see a small decrease in the ratio of LPNs
to admissions that is statistically significant 3+ years after a merger.
Combined with the employment to output results, the lack of a wage effect after a merger indicates that
the decrease in employment is the result of an efficiency gain and not an increase in monopsony power.
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 display the results of the event study regressions where both mergers and systems
are included in one specification. Figure 1.3 illustrates the merger coefficients while Figure 1.4 illustrates the
system-joining coefficients. The effects of mergers on the number of RNs and LPNs, as displayed in Figure
13The numerical tables are available upon request.
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1.3, are largely similar to those shown in Figure 1.2. This specification still shows a statistically significant
decrease in admissions, and LPNs to admissions in the first couple of years following a merger. All of these
results indicate some small efficiency gains following a merger, but they are not as long-term or as large in
magnitude as those in Figure 1.2. This is because in Figure 1.2, most of the system-joinings are in the control
group, where here they are explicitly accounted for. While there is a clear decrease in the number of RNs
and LPNs following a merger there is no change in wages. Again, this result is consistent with post-merger
efficiency gains, rather than an increase in monopsony power.
In Figure 1.4 we do not see any obvious jump in employment levels before and after system-joinings.
While the results for RNs and LPNs are marginally significant at the 10% level, it is clear that they are very
different in magnitude from the effects associated with hospital mergers. For example, the coefficient on
RNs one year post-merger is −0.16, significant at the 1% level, whereas the coefficient on RNs for the period
one year after system-joining is −0.05, significant at the 10% level. These effects entirely disappear after
three years, and in fact, the coefficients become positive when looking 5+ years out from the time of the
event. Once again we see no change in wage following a system-joining, continuing to rule out exploitation
of market power as a reason for the change in employment levels.
A post-estimation test of the difference in coefficients for each year following a merger and each year
following a system-joining shows that the coefficients are statistically different at the 1% level. For example,
I can reject the null hypothesis that the difference in coefficients one year post-merger and one-year post
system-joining is equal to zero.
1.4.4 Propensity Score Analyses
The difference-in-differences and event study results may be biased if certain pre-existing trends in the
outcome variables differ across those hospitals that consolidate and those that do not. One way to mitigate
this problem is to use propensity score weighting (Dranove and Lindrooth, 2003). In this section, I model
the probability of consolidation based on certain observable hospital and market characteristics:
Mergeit = β1Zit + δ1Xmt + it (1.5)
Systemit = β2Zit + δ2Xmt + it (1.6)
Mergeit is an indicator with a value of one for hospitals that merge in time t and Systemit is an indicator
with a value of one for hospitals that join a system in time t. Zit andXmt are a set of hospital and market-level
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variables that affect both the likelihood of merging and the outcomes. Namely, I weight on the population of
the market, cost per bed, whether the hospital is in a system (for the mergers-only regression), the number
of hospitals in the same zip code, whether the hospital is not-for-profit or for-profit, and concentration level
of the market(HHI).
After re-estimating equations (1) to (4) correcting for selection bias using these weights, we see that the
merger results are actually stronger. These results are presented in Table 1.6 and Figure 1.5. The effects of
merging on employment are even stronger, with 30% and 36% decreases in the number of RNs and LPNs after
a merger, significant at the 1% level. Once again, I find no effect on payroll per worker, further supporting
the hypothesis that the reduction in labor is an efficiency effect rather than exploitation of buying power.
The estimations when examining both mergers and system-joinings are presented in Table 1.6 (Equation
(2)) and Figures 1.6 and 1.7. Again, there is no effect on system-joinings on the number of RNs or LPNs in
a hospital. The change in number of admissions following a system-joining is more negative and statistically
significant. The coefficient indicates that admissions decrease by 9% following a system-joining. The effects
on mergers after adding in system-joinings are relatively similar to those when estimating only equation (1).
Lastly, there is still no evidence of a wage effect due to hospital consolidation when looking at mergers
or mergers and system-joinings.
1.4.5 Additional Analyses
So far the results point to an increase in efficiency post-consolidation and not an increase in buying power,
at least with respect to the nurses labor market. Two other ways I check to see if this result holds are(1)
explore two other sources of wage data and (2) examine other hospitals in the market that do not merge yet
are exposed to a merger (“Rivals Analysis”).
1.4.5.1 Additional Wage Data Analyses
As described in section 1.3.3, I only observe the net change in average hospital payroll per worker and do
not observe the extent of the true change in RN and LPN wages. To deal with this limitation, I supplement
these analyses using the NSSRN and BLS data. Specifically, I examine how the market wage of RNs change
as the number of consolidations in a market increases by estimating the following equations:
Mergers Only:
ln(Wagekt) = θ#Mergerskt + βXkt + µk + τt + kt (1.7)
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Mergers and System-Joinings:
ln(Wagekt) = θ1#Mergerskt + θ2#SystemJoiningskt + βXkt + µk + τt + kt (1.8)
where Wagekt is the average log hourly wage of an RN in Component Economic Area (market) k in year
t. When using the NSSRN data, I restrict the analysis to only examining the average market wage of RNs
working in a hospital. The BLS data does not allow for this type of detailed stratification.
Xkt is a set of market control variables. Since the NSSRN provides some demographic information, I
control for average age, race, gender and marital status of hospital RNs in the market. µk is a CEA-level
fixed effect, τt is a year fixed effect, and all standard errors are clustered at the CEA.
The results from estimating equations (7) and (8) are presented in table 1.7. Regardless of the data
source used, the effect of hospital consolidations on the wages of RNs is very small and highly insignificant.
These results are consistent with the wage results obtained with the AHA data, and they continue to indicate
that the effects of consolidation on employment are due to an increase in efficiency post-consolidation and
not an increase in monopsony/buying power.
1.4.5.2 Rivals Analysis
Finally, I examine employment effects for hospitals that are exposed to a merger in the market but do not
merge themselves, i.e. “Rival” hospitals. As discussed in Section 1.2, if the consolidation affects competition
for labor, we may expect there to be employment spillover effects at rival hospitals after a merger. Following
Woolley (1989), Connor and Feldman (1998), and Dafny (2009), I conduct a rival analysis where I estimate
the effects of being exposed to a merger on the employment effects of interest.
Given that there is no evidence of wage effects thus far, the results indicate that the effects are efficiency
driven. I can further test this by seeing if there are any employment effects at rival hospitals, i.e. those
hospitals that are in the same market as a hospital that merges but do not merge. These hospitals experience
the same change in concentration but should experience none of the gains in efficiencies as the merging
hospitals. If there is monopsony power in the market, I would expect to see a decrease in number of RNs
and/or LPNs at non-merging hospitals following a merger of other hospitals within the market. The key
assumption here is that exposure to a merger creates an exogenous change in competition for RN services. I
look at hospitals that are exposed to exactly one merger and compare them to hospitals that are not exposed
to any mergers. Given that system-joinings are so common, I cannot find enough markets that are exposed
to only one hospital that joins a system. Therefore, I conduct the rival analysis for only rivals of merging
hospitals.
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I perform a difference-in-differences analysis and estimate the following specification using OLS:
ln(Yit) = α0 + β1Beforeit + β2Afterit + λXit + γi + θt + it (1.9)
where ln (Yit) represents the natural log of two possible outcome variables for hospital i in year t : the
number of registered nurses (RNs) and the number of registered nurses plus licensed practical nurses (LPNs)
nurses employed by hospital i in year t. Beforeit is an indicator equal to 1 if the hospital is in the period
before “exposure” to a merger and Afterit is an indicator equal to 1 if the hospital in a period following
“exposure” to a merger. Indicators for the amount of years since the merger occurred are alternatively used
in place of the aggregated indicator Afterit. Xit is vector of the same time-varying hospital and market
control variables as used in equation (1). Year fixed-effects (θt) are included and the regressions are run with
hospital fixed-effects (γi) unless otherwise indicated. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital level.
The results of the pre- versus post-merger effects are reported in Table 1.8. Being in the post-merger
period does not appear to be associated with a change in the number of RNs or LPNs employed. As expected,
being in the pre-merger period is also not associated with any difference in number of RNs or LPNs at a
hospital.
I also conduct more of a traditional event study, like that in Section 1.4.3, on rival hospitals and present
these results in Tables 6 and 7. Table 1.9 presents a condensed event study where the intervals are in groups
of five years (e.g. 1-5 years since merger, 6-10 years since merger,...), and Table 1.20 presents the results of
having individual indicators for each year since the merger occurred (e.g. “1 year since merger, 2 years since
merger, ...).
The fixed-effects specification in Table 1.9 indicates that being 11-15 years removed from exposure to a
merger is associated with having 4.4% fewer nurses and this grows to 5.3% fewer nurses when 16-20 years
removed (significant at the 5% level and 10% level, respectively). The further disaggregated indicators (Table
1.10) show that this effect is concentrated in years 12-17, with the largest coefficient coming in year 15. This
means that exposure to a merger is not associated with a reduction in RN employment until 12 years after
the merger occurred. While it is possible that the effects of an increase in buying power could take 10+ years
to occur, it is unlikely. These results at long horizons are probably due to other unobserved variations in
the markets, rather than effects directly related to mergers. These results, therefore, appear to confirm that
the employment effects of a merger are driven by efficiency gains and not an increase in monopsony power.
The rival event study results are similar for LPN employment levels. The fixed-effects specification in
Table 1.9 does not show a significant effect until 16-20 years after exposure to a merger, with a coefficient of
-0.08. The further disaggregated indicators (Table 1.10) show that this effect is concentrated to years 14-16,
19
with the largest coefficient coming in year 16. This means that exposure to a merger is not associated with
a reduction in LPN employment until 14 years after the merger occurred. Again, these results confirm that
the effects of a merger on LPN levels are driven by efficiency gains and not an increase in monopsony power.
1.5 Conclusions
Previous studies of hospital merger effects have focused on prices, costs, and patient outcomes. There
is, however, reason to believe that mergers may also affect labor market outcomes as well. First, hospitals
may see an increase in efficiency through shared knowledge or facilities. Second, a merger may create a
change in labor market competition and lead to an increase in employer monopsony power. The latter has
been a concern for the market for nurses due to their perceived relative immobility and specialized labor.
Prior studies of monopsony typically look at a change in hospital market concentration on the market wages
of nurses. None of these studies, however, exploit mergers as a source of change in competition. In this
chapter, I examine the effects of hospital mergers and system-joinings, which have been largely ignored in
the literature, on the employment outcomes of Registered Nurses and Licensed Practical Nurses. I find a clear
reduction in employment levels following a merger but no change in wages. These results are consistent with
efficiency arguments for the mergers and system-joinings and not with increases in buying power. In other
words, some of the cost reductions documented in the previous literature (Dranove et al, 2003;Harrison, 2011)
take the form of a reduction in the employment of nurses. Given these reductions, it would be interesting to
examine other subsets of hospital staffing, to see what workers, if any, are replacing these nurses.
I also examine the effects of hospital system-joinings on the same labor market outcomes. System-joinings
are another popular type of hospital consolidation, yet have largely been ignored in the hospital consolidation
literature. While I do find some small RN and LPN employment reductions after a system-joining, these
results are concentrated in the first three years and disappear completely by year five.
As consolidation is not a random event, I address this selection problem through the use of control
variables and propensity score weighting. There may be factors that I do not observe that still affect the
probability of consolidating and are correlated with the outcome variables. For instance, profit would be
a preferable measure of financial distress than cost per bed, but I do not observe revenues. I also cannot
unambiguously rule out monopsony power as a cause for the reductions in RN and LPN employment since
I do not observe RN and LPN wages at the hospital level, only average hospital wages across all employees.
Despite these limitations, the results provide the first evidence of employment level effects following a
hospital merger and support the previous studies that do not find evidence of monopsony power in the
market for nurses (Hansen, 1992; Hirsch and Schumacher, 1995; Hirsch and Schumacher, 2005). Hospital
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monopsony power has long been thought to be a problem in the nurse labor market. Given that I examine
27 years of data, three different wage sources, and am able to identify a real change in market competition
by examining almost the entire of population of hospital consolidations, it is likely that the monopsonistic
exploitation is not as prevalent as once believed.
While this study makes no statements on net welfare effects since there is no analysis of price or patient
outcomes, it does point to the need for including employment effects in an overall welfare analysis of hospital
consolidations. A full welfare analysis of any hospital consolidation should not only include price effects
and changes in patient outcomes but also how employment changes and how these effects contribute to
patient outcomes. On the other hand, given that I also find a decrease in number of admissions following
consolidation as well as no change in the number of RNs per admissions, it may be the case that these
employment decreases do not affect quality of care.
Finally, although I do not find employment effects attributable to system-joinings, it does not rule out
that some system-joinings may experience similar effects to those of a hospital merger. Since system-joinings
cover such a broad range of consolidation, in order to get a more complete picture of how system-joinings
affect employment levels in hospitals, it would be necessary to identify those system-joinings that most closely
mimic a merger. It is possible that these system-joinings that partake in a greater form of consolidation (i.e.
those whose consolidation most closely resembles a merger) see greater employment effects.
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Figure 1.1: Number of Hospital Mergers and System-Joinings: 1983-2009
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics of all hospitals
Merging System-Joining Other
Hospitals Hospitals Hospitals
RNs 503.84 220.51 155.04
LPNs 83.26 35.73 31.67
RNs+LPNs 587.10 256.25 186.71
RNs/1000 Admissions 23.04 33.33 34.35
LPNs/1000 Admissions 5.61 10.67 24.90
RNs+LPNs/1000 Admissions 28.65 31.01 59.26
Payroll per Worker ($000s) 28.08 28.47 22.95
Admissions (000s) 24.92 10.23 8.64
Not for Profit (%) 64.85 41.18 49.38
For-profit (%) 18.20 29.04 11.29
Government (%) 16.83 29.77 39.32
HHI (beds) 995.38 981.95 966.95
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Table 1.2: NSSRN Summary Statistics
Hospital Nursing Home Doctor’s Office
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Log wage 3.14 0.39 2.97 0.42 2.99 0.50
Hourly wage 24.99 15.52 21.52 16.57 22.50 16.42
Hours per week 35.86 10.87 35.13 11.58 33.83 11.74
Weeks per year 50.33 5.44 49.94 6.49 49.84 6.32
Age (Median) 39.14 10.47 45.66 11.42 42.98 10.13
Male 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.37 0.23 0.42
Race = White 0.90 0.30 0.92 0.27 0.94 0.24
Married 0.69 0.46 0.69 0.46 0.79 0.40
Widowed/Divorced/Separated 0.14 0.35 0.20 0.40 0.13 0.34
Never married 0.15 0.35 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.25
Any children? 0.90 0.30 0.89 0.31 0.86 0.35
Full time 0.71 0.45 0.68 0.47 0.64 0.48
RN Diploma 0.34 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.41 0.49
Associate’s Degree 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.48 0.33 0.47
Bachelor’s Degree 0.27 0.45 0.15 0.35 0.25 0.44
Master’s Degree 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.07
Involved in Direct Patient Care 0.92 0.27 0.03 0.17 0.09 0.29
% time spent on administration 8.40 18.89 19.32 26.91 11.03 19.94
% time spent on consultation 5.16 11.03 7.16 12.76 8.13 13.37
% time spent on patient care 69.67 34.07 38.23 33.96 68.97 31.23
% time spent on supervising 10.70 19.34 26.61 26.20 5.67 13.54
% time spent on research 1.41 6.84 1.62 6.69 1.89 8.62
% time spent on teaching 3.36 10.06 4.59 12.87 1.82 6.63
% time spent on other duties 1.17 8.06 2.23 11.37 2.33 11.68
Household income ¡ 15K 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.18 0.01 0.11
15K ¡ Household income ¡ 25K 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.31 0.05 0.22
25K ¡ Household income ¡ 35K 0.14 0.35 0.17 0.37 0.10 0.30
35K ¡ Household income ¡ 50K 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44 0.20 0.40
50K ¡ Household income ¡ 75K 0.28 0.45 0.24 0.43 0.27 0.45
75K ¡ Household income ¡ 100K 0.15 0.35 0.12 0.32 0.18 0.38
100K ¡ Household income ¡ 150K 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.23 0.12 0.33
Household income ¿ 150K 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.24
Observations 109575 12682 14551
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics of BLS Wage Data: 1997-2009
Observations Mean S.D Min Max
Mean Wage 4270 24.19 5.49 7.68 53.38
Median Wage (50th Percentile) 4270 23.65 5.52 7.21 55.88
Hourly Wage of 10th Percentile 3952 17.81 3.87 5.54 33.88
Hourly Wage of 25th Percentile 3952 20.62 4.52 6.10 45.16
Hourly Wage of 75th Percentile 3951 28.04 6.47 8.34 63.39
Hourly Wage of 90th Percentile 3947 32.57 7.59 10.17 69.19
Total Employment of RNs (by MSA) 3660 5852.21 9514.59 60 99010
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Table 1.4: Examining Hospitals Before and After a Merger or System-Joining
Merging Hospitals System-Joining Hospitals
5 Years Before 1 Year Before 1 Year After 5 Years After 5 Years Before 1 Year Before 1 Year After 5 Years After
RNs 506.65 479.38 482.21 589.76 306.54 328.68 173.30 189.96
LPNs 99.31 78.69 68.30 73.21 56.15 46.56 29.98 29.62
RNs+LPNs 605.96 558.07 550.51 662.97 362.70 375.24 203.27 219.59
Admissions (000s) 24.56 23.93 23.47 30.27 14.49 15.07 8.40 9.23
RNs/1000 Admissions 23.45 23.20 22.16 22.03 25.05 27.95 28.95 27.89
LPNs/1000 Admissions 6.08 5.68 4.78 4.36 8.00 6.73 9.40 8.23
Payroll per Worker($000s) 24.01 28.49 30.00 33.65 23.04 28.23 27.61 31.51
Not for Profit (%) 63.33 62.33 66.53 69.11 66.92 66.15 60.55 38.40
For-profit (%) 18.95 22.43 16.63 15.77 5.67 11.22 21.10 34.35
Government (%) 17.72 15.24 16.83 15.12 27.41 22.63 18.34 27.25
HHI (beds) 683.67 708.24 1129.26 1178.56 949.57 980.78 981.22 937.85
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Table 1.5: Effects of Hospital Consolidation on Employment Outcomes: difference-in-differences Estimates
Mergers Mergers Systems
Dependent Variables Equation (1) Equation (2)
RNs -0.226*** - 0.204*** -0.026
(0.034) (0.034) (0.045)
LPNs -0.287*** -0.270*** 0.047
(0.045) (0.045) (0.061)
RNs+LPNs -0.233*** -0.212*** -0.007
(0.034) (0.034) (0.044)
Admissions -0.225*** -0.205*** -0.070
(0.033) (0.032) (0.044)
RNs/Admissions -0.001 0.000 0.044*
(0.017) (0.015) (0.024)
LPNs/Admissions -0.063** -0.066** 0.115**
(0.033) (0.031) (0.055)
RNs+LPNs/Admissions -0.008 -0.006 0.062***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.023)
Avg Hospital Wage 0.006 0.006 -0.008
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Each row in Column 1 represents a separate regressions, showing the coefficient for AfterMit only. Each
row in the next two columns combined also represents a single regression, with coefficients for AfterMit
and AfterSit reported in Columns 2 and 3, respectively. All regressions contain the following control
variables: cost per bed, the number of hospitals in the same zip code, whether the hospital is not-for-profit
or for-profit, market population, and concentration level of the market (HHI). Year fixed-effects are
included in all regressions and standard errors are clustered at the hospital level.
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Figure 1.2: Event Study Results: Effects of Mergers (Only Merger Effects Estimated)
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Graphs indicate the estimated effects and 95% confidence intervals for each year surrounding hospital mergers. The year prior to
merger is omitted in all regressions. All outcomes are measured in logs.
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Figure 1.3: Event Study Results: Effects of Mergers (Mergers and Systems Effects Both Estimated)
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Graphs indicate the estimated effects and 95% confidence intervals for each year surrounding a merger or system-joining. The year
prior to merger is omitted in all regressions. All outcomes are measured in logs.
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Figure 1.4: Event Study Results: Effects of Joining Systems (Mergers and Systems Effects Both Estimated)
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Graphs indicate the estimated effects and 95% confidence intervals for each year surrounding a merger or system-joining. The year
prior to merger is omitted in all regressions. All outcomes are measured in logs.
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Table 1.6: Effects of Hospital Consolidation on Employment Outcomes: difference-in-differences Estimates,
Weighted by Propensity Scores
Mergers Mergers Systems
Dependent Variables Equation (1) Equation (2)
RNs -0.302*** - 0.300*** -0.041
(0.040) (0.041) (0.050)
LPNs -0.356*** -0.385*** 0.034
(0.050) (0.051) (0.066)
Admissions -0.556** -0.558*** -0.09**
(0.081) (0.081) (0.048)
RNs/Admissions 0.008 0.005 0.047**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.023)
LPNs/Admissions -0.047 -0.081** 0.121**
(0.034) (0.034) (0.055)
Avg Hospital Wage -0.000 0.009 -0.008
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013)
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Each row in Column 1 represents a separate regressions, showing the coefficient for AfterMit only. All
regressions contain the following control variables: cost per bed, the number of hospitals in the same zip
code, whether the hospital is not-for-profit or for-profit, market population, and concentration level of the
market (HHI). Year fixed-effects are included in all regressions and standard errors are clustered at the
hospital level.
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Figure 1.5: Event Study Results: Effects of Mergers (Only Merger Effects Estimated and Weighted by
Propensity Scores)
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Graphs indicate the estimated effects and 95% confidence intervals for each year surrounding hospital mergers. The year prior to
merger is omitted in all regressions. All outcomes are measured in logs.
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Figure 1.6: Event Study Results: Effects of Mergers (Mergers and Systems Effects Both Estimated and
Weighted by Propensity Scores)
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Graphs indicate the estimated effects and 95% confidence intervals for each year surrounding hospital mergers. The year prior to
merger is omitted in all regressions. All outcomes are measured in logs.
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Figure 1.7: Event Study Results: Effects of System (Mergers and Systems Effects Both Estimated and
Weighted by Propensity Scores)
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Graphs indicate the estimated effects and 95% confidence intervals for each year surrounding hospital mergers. The year prior to
merger is omitted in all regressions. All outcomes are measured in logs.
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Table 1.7: Supplemental Wage Data Results using NSSRN and BLS data
Mergers Mergers Systems
Equation (7) Equation (8)
Market Log Wage of RN (NSSRN) -0.005 -0.006 -0.003
(0.010) (0.034) (0.004)
Market Log Wage of RN (BLS) 0.004 0.005 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
The first row is the effect on RN wage using the National Sample Survey of Registered Nurses (NSSRN). The second row is the effect on RN wage
using the Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates (BLS).
Table 1.8: Rival Analysis: Employment Effects on Hospitals Exposed to a Merger, Difference-in-Differences Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RNs RNs LPNs LPNs
Pre-merger -0.0590 -0.0328 -0.0329 -0.0280
(0.0397) (0.0180) (0.0480) (0.0318)
After-merger -0.0431 -0.0267 -0.0718 -0.0187
(0.0268) (0.0180) (0.0528) (0.0301)
Hospital FE Yes Yes
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
All regressions contain the following control variables: cost per bed, the number of hospitals in the same zip code, whether the hospital is
not-for-profit or for-profit, market population, and concentration level of the market (HHI). Year fixed-effects are included in all regressions and
standard errors are clustered at the hospital level.
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Table 1.9: Event Study: Rival Analysis, Employment Effects on Hospitals Exposed to a Merger
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RNs RNs LPNs LPNs
Pre-merger -0.0325 -0.0100 0.0274 -0.0010
(0.0289) (0.0142) (0.0401) (0.0251)
1 to 5 years since merger -0.0034 0.0112 0.0261 0.0237
(0.0230) (0.0134) (0.0328) (0.0216)
6 to 10 years since merger -0.0101 -0.0096 0.0000 -0.0009
(0.0268) (0.0156) (0.0358) (0.0266)
11 to 15 years since merger -0.0389 -0.0440** -0.0221 -0.0320
(0.0281) (0.0159) (0.0372) (0.0311)
16 to 20 years since merger -0.0394 -0.0532* -0.1737** -0.0804*
(0.0364) (0.0206) (0.0537) (0.0384)
Hospital FE X X
All regressions contain the following control variables: cost per bed, the number of hospitals in the same
zip code, whether the hospital is not-for-profit or for-profit, market population, and concentration level of
the market (HHI). Year fixed-effects are included in all regressions and standard errors are clustered at the
hospital level.
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Table 1.10: Event Study: Rivals Analysis, Employment Effects on Hospitals Exposed to a Merger
Years since merger: RNs RNs LPNs LPNs
< 0 -0.032 -0.009 0.027 0.001
(0.029) (0.014) (0.040) (0.025)
1 0.007 0.008 0.023 0.016
(0.025) (0.014) (0.035) (0.023)
2 0.008 0.020 0.030 0.034
(0.024) (0.016) (0.036) (0.025)
3 -0.006 0.011 0.012 0.015
(0.025) (0.016) (0.036) (0.026)
4 -0.022 0.009 0.047 0.038
(0.026) (0.016) (0.036) (0.026)
5 -0.007 0.010 0.019 0.019
(0.027) (0.017) (0.038) (0.028)
6 -0.005 0.003 0.019 0.021
(0.027) (0.017) (0.037) (0.030)
7 -0.008 0.004 -0.005 0.003
(0.028) (0.018) (0.039) (0.030)
8 -0.009 -0.013 0.005 0.003
(0.029) (0.018) (0.040) (0.030)
9 -0.018 -0.024 -0.015 -0.020
(0.030) (0.018) (0.040) (0.032)
10 -0.010 -0.020 -0.009 -0.014
(0.031) (0.018) (0.042) (0.035)
11 -0.040 -0.028 -0.025 -0.013
(0.032) (0.017) (0.042) (0.035)
12 -0.075* -0.037* -0.002 0.002
(0.037) (0.019) (0.043) (0.034)
13 -0.059 -0.039* -0.009 -0.025
(0.035) (0.018) (0.043) (0.037)
14 0.020 -0.072*** -0.025 -0.084*
(0.034) (0.021) (0.051) (0.043)
15 0.003 -0.076** -0.080 -0.108*
(0.037) (0.023) (0.056) (0.046)
16 -0.022 -0.074** -0.147* -0.116*
(0.039) (0.025) (0.060) (0.049)
17 -0.061 -0.062* -0.162** -0.083
(0.044) (0.024) (0.063) (0.048)
18 -0.038 -0.039 -0.147* -0.082
(0.043) (0.025) (0.065) (0.050)
19 -0.021 -0.044 -0.249** -0.094
(0.046) (0.026) (0.077) (0.059)
20 -0.059 -0.047 -0.184* -0.024
(0.044) (0.029) (0.073) (0.056)
Hospital FE X X
All regressions contain the following control variables: cost per bed, the number of hospitals in the same zip code, whether the
hospital is not-for-profit or for-profit, market population, and concentration level of the market (HHI). Year fixed-effects are included
in all regressions and standard errors are clustered at the hospital level.
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1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 A Simple Model of Monopsony
If a hospital faces an upward sloping supply curve of nurses, it is possible that monopsonistic behavior on
the part of hospitals could explain changes in employment and wages. If a hospital has monopsony power,
they will behave like the hospital in Figure 1.8.
For the hospital, profit maximization occurs where marginal revenue product (MRP) equals marginal
expenditure (ME). Thus the monopsony employment is LM and the monopsony wage is WM . Keep in mind
the hospital will only hire a nurse when there is value or revenue to be gained from the unit so the hospitals
demand for each nurse is their marginal revenue product. Clearly the profit maximizing number of nurses
and corresponding wage is less than the amount of nurses that would have been hired under competition, LC
and WC , respectively. Additionally, it is worth noting that the monopsony wage of WM is not only below
the competitive wage of WC , but well below the marginal value of labor, WV . The difference between the
marginal value and the wage paid is known as the monopsonistic exploitation.
39
Figure 1.8: Monopsony Labor Market
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1.6.2 Characteristics Associated with Consolidation
These results show that a higher cost per bed is associated with an increased probability for both types
of hospital consolidations. In addition not-for-profit hospitals and for-profit hospitals are more likely to
consolidate than government-owned hospitals. Having another hospital in the same zip code is also associated
with a higher probability to consolidate.
Table 1.11: The Effects of Hospital Characteristics on the Probability of Consolidating: Mergers and
System-Joinings
(1) (2)
Mergers System-Joinings
HHI(00s) -0.0027*** -0.0013*
(0.0006) (0.0005)
cost per bed (000s) 0.0231*** 0.0286***
(0.0003) (0.0002)
System Membership 0.7775***
(0.0175)
Not-For-Profit 0.2768*** 0.1673***
(0.0136) (0.0118)
For-Profit 0.5036*** 0.1346***
(0.0177) (0.0168)
Number of Hospitals (in zip code) 0.0556*** 0.0253***
(0.0043) (0.0043)
Constant -1.9731*** -1.6396***
(0.0147) (0.0128)
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
For ease of interpretation, HHI is divided by 100 and cost per bed is divided by 10000.
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CHAPTER II
State Regulation and the Mobility of Nurses: An Examination of
the Nurse Licensure Compact
2.1 Introduction
Occupational licensing is pervasive in the US and Europe. Nearly 29% of the US workforce requires a
federal- or state-granted license to practice or work in their occupation (Kleiner and Krueger 2008; Thornton
and Timmons, 2013) and over 800 occupations are licensed by at least one state (Kleiner 2000). While
licensing is meant to protect consumers and ensure safety by certifying provider quality, it also may create
rents for incumbent members of the occupation.
One mechanism through which licensing could restrict supply is by impeding geographic mobility. Since
licensing and certification is primarily at the state level, workers typically must obtain a new license whenever
they move across states before they are permitted to work. Similarly, workers typically must obtain separate
licenses for each state in which they work, even if their jobs are identical. Such a barrier to mobility may
prevent workers from seeking jobs across state lines, misallocating workers geographically and depressing
employment and labor force participation. Moreover, licensed professionals may be less likely to move to
areas of high demand.
In this chapter, we examine the impact of frictions imposed by licensing requirements on the labor market
for nurses, exploiting a unique policy change that made it substantially easier for nurses to work and move
across state lines. Nursing is an important occupation to focus on, as the availability of nurses is important
for community health, hospital care, and disaster relief. Furthermore, an already acute nursing shortage
is expected to increase over the next decade, as more nurses retire and the aging population increases
demand for health care services (Buerhaus, Staiger, Auerbach, 2009). Insurance expansions embodied in the
Affordable Care Act will only exacerbate this shortage. Removing licensing barriers is one mechanism to
This chapter is co-authored with Kevin Stange.
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better utilize the existing supply of trained nurses. The ability for technology to improve health care delivery
is also hampered by cross-state licensing barriers for health care workers, which makes telemedicine difficult
legally (Sulentic 1991).
Surprisingly, compelling evidence on the impact of licensing on the geographic scope of labor markets is
thin. Several studies, dating back a half-century, document a cross-sectional correlation between licensing
restrictions and interstate mobility of professionals (Holen, 1965; Pashigian, 1979; Conrad and Dolan,1980;
Kleiner, Gay, and Greene, 1982). A challenge with this cross-sectional analysis is that licensure practices
may correlate with other unobserved state-level attributes that influence migration. Peterson, Pandya,
LeBang (2014) address this problem by exploiting changes in residency training requirements for immigrant
physicians within states over time, finding that states that impose more stringent requirements receive fewer
immigrant physicians. We add to this literature by examining a recent policy change, the Nurse Licensure
Compact (NLC), with a compelling research design that lets us control for several sources of bias that may
confound previous estimates.
The NLC was introduced to reduce licensing burdens by permitting registered nurses living in member
states to practice across state lines. It also made licensure easier to obtain for nurses moving between
member states. Twenty-four states have implemented the NLC since its inception in 2000 and another 5
states currently have NLC legislation pending. We exploit the staggered adoption of the NLC across states
and over time to examine whether a reduction in licensure-induced barriers is associated with a greater
likelihood of cross-state commuting, longer travel time to work, and greater labor force participation of
nurses. We estimate difference-in-differences models, comparing nurses in states adopting the NLC to those
in states that do not. While this controls for time-invariant characteristics of states that may correlate with
both labor market outcomes and licensure laws, state-specific time-varying factors may still bias estimates of
the policy. A unique feature of our setting is that we are able to use non-nurse health workers (who are not
affected by the NLC) to construct triple difference models to control for any health care labor market changes
that may happen to correlate with NLC adoption. We find that this feature is important, as results from
the triple difference models are substantively different than the basic difference-in-differences, suggesting a
time-varying source of bias in the latter.
Using data on over 1.5 million nurses and other health care workers from the 1990 and 2000 Census and
the 2006-2012 American Community Surveys, we find no effect of NLC adoption on labor force participation.
Estimates are precise enough to rule out even small impacts on labor force participation. Thus, it does not
appear that cross-state licensing restrictions impact the aggregate labor supply of nurses. However, we
find positive effects of NLC adoption on travel time to work, particularly among nurses living in MSAs
that encompass multiple states. This suggests that eliminating cross-state licensure restrictions expands the
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geographic scope of the nurse labor market. Though estimated effects on the likelihood of working across
state lines are positive and large for multi-state MSAs, they are not statistically different from zero. This
study provides some of the first evidence on the likely effects of nationalizing nurse licensure.
We provide background on nurse licensing and the NLC in the next section. Section 2.3 reviews the
literature on occupational regulation. Our methods and data are described in Section 2.4. Results are
discussed in Section 2.5 and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Nurse Licensure and RN Compact
In 1947, New York was the first state to require mandatory licenses for nurses. Today, every state requires
a nurse to obtain a license to practice within the state (Benefiel, 2011) Obtaining a license typically means
passing a licensing examination and meeting requirements that are set by each state individually. The exams
for registered nurses and licensed practical nurses differ from each other and although the exams may differ
by state, there has been a trend toward uniformity in recent years (Barnum, 1997). Besides an examination,
there are monetary costs associated with obtaining an initial license in a state. For example, in the state
of California, the examination registration fee is $200 plus the fee for verification of licensure ($60) plus the
application fee of $100. If a nurse is licensed in another state, he/she must pass the California exam and
pay all of the same application fees before obtaining a California nursing license.
The Nurse Licensure Compact (NLC) was first passed in 1999 by Utah and Arkansas, and Utah was
the first to implement on Jan 1, 2000 along with Maryland, Texas and Wisconsin (This conflicts with the
list which says Maryland was first to implement in 1999). This compact allows a nurse licensed in one
NLC-member state to practice in other NLC states without obtaining a separate license for the other state.
Each state that is a member mutually recognizes other member states. Since 2000, in total, 24 states have
implemented the Nurse Licensure Compact and another 5 states currently have NLC legislation pending.
While 12 of the 24 states joined the compact in its first two years of existence, an average of 1-2 states
per year have continued to join the compact since. Figure 2.1 displays the roll-out of the compact and how
many states were part of the compact in 2000, 2004, and 2008. It is worth noting that each member state
has another member state that is adjacent to it except for Rhode Island (although Massachusetts currently
has legislation pending).
In order for a state to join the NLC, they must meet four requirements: 1) The bill language drafted by
state legislators must mirror that of the “NLC Model Legislation,” that is provided by the National Council
of State Boards of Nursing; 2) The state legislature must pass the legislation; 3) The state board of nursing
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must implement the compact1; and 4) The state must pay $3000 per year to keep their membership in the
NLC active. The NLC applies to registered nurses (RNs), licensed practical (LPNs) and licensed vocational
nurses (LVNs) only.2 To be eligible for a multistate license, a nurse’s primary state of residence must be a
compact-member state. As long as a nurse declares a compact state as a primary state of residence and the
nurse is in good standing, the license automatically becomes a multistate license and the nurse can practice
physically or electronically in other compact states. If a nurse works in a compact states but lives (i.e. has
a primary state of residence) in a non-compact state, he/she is not eligible for a multistate license.
If a compact-eligible nurse permanently relocates to another compact state, that is, the nurse obtains
a new driver’s license in another state, changes the state where he/she votes, and/or files federal taxes in
another state, the nurse must apply for licensure by endorsement and declare the new state as his/her primary
state of residence. This must be completed within 90 days of moving although some states are currently in
the process of amending the amount of time a nurse may practice with a license issued by another state.
Figure 2.2 provides a flow chart explaining whether a nurse is eligible for a multi-state license.
Advocates of the NLC cite five main benefits. First, The NLC clarifies the authority to practice for many
nurses currently engaged in telenursing or interstate practice. Second, the NLC provides greater mobility
for nurses. (They cite the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Health Resources and Services
Administration’s 2010 report, “Health Licensing Board Report to Congress” as evidence.) Third, the NLC
improves access to licensed nurses during a disaster or other times of great need for qualified nursing services.
Fourth, the NLC improves access to nursing care. Finally, the NLC enhances discipline and information-
sharing among participating states.
2.3 Related Literature on Occupational Licensing
Relative to its prevalence, there is little research on the labor market effects of occupational licensing and
restrictions.3 Prior work on the labor market effects have focused primarily on wages, generally finding that
restrictive licensing is associated with higher wages (Thornton and Timmons, 2013)4. Using unique data on
the dental health of Air Force recruits, Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) find that restrictive licensing increases
dental prices and earnings of dentists. Weeden (2002) finds that licensed occupations have higher wages,
controlling for a whole host of other individual- and occupation-specific determinants of earnings, such as the
1The takes approximately one year from the time the bill is passed.
2Advanced Practical Registered Nurses (APRNs) do not fall under the NLC, but instead have their own separate APRN
Compact that provides for a multistate license.
3Kleiner (2000) and Kleiner (2006) provide an overview of much of the theoretical and empirical literature on occupational
regulation.
4There is also a very small literature on the effect of licensing on provider and service quality (Kleiner and Kudrle 2000;
Angrist and Guryan, 2003) and output markets (Schaumans and Verboven, 2008; Hotz and Xiao, 2011; Kleiner, Marier, Won
Park, and Wing 2011; Stange, 2014).
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skill and task requirements of the job and education level. Kugler and Sauer (2005) find very large returns
to acquiring an occupational license among immigrant physicians in Israel. A unique feature of their study
is that they exploit variation in licensing that is driven by a policy that assigns immigrant physicians to
different re-training regimes based on their experience. This represents an advance over much of the prior
literature, which simply compared licensed with similar unlicensed occupations. More recently, Kleiner and
Park (2010) and Kleiner, Marier, Won Park, and Wing (2011) find that changes in occupational regulations
for dental hygienists and nurse practitioners, respectively, increase wages for these occupations.
While the evidence of licensing’s effect of wages is robust, there is little direct evidence on whether
reduced labor mobility is the primary channel. Several studies document a cross-sectional correlation between
licensing restrictions and interstate mobility. Fifty years ago, Holen (1965) found that the in-migration of
dentists, lawyers, judges, physicians, and surgeons was higher in states that had easier re-licensing. Pashigian
(1979) found that the in-migration of lawyers was hampered by restrictive licensing. Kleiner, Gay, and
Greene (1982) examined mobility in 14 different occupations as it relates to licensure restrictiveness. They
found that states with less restrictive licensing and easier endorsement from other states have higher rates
of in-migration. Thus restrictive licensing creates a barrier to mobility, misallocating workers across states.
Thornton and Timmons (2013) add to this evidence by showing that the occupational regulation of massage
therapist through state licensing appears to reduce the number of massage therapists, while Zapletal (2014)
finds no effect of occupational licensing on the number of cosmetologists. Conrad and Dolan (1980) showed
that reciprocity rules limit the migration of professions into restrictive states. A challenge with these cross-
sectional analyses is that licensure practices may correlate with other state-level attributes that influence
migration (beyond the variables controlled for). Peterson, Pandya, LeBang (2014) address this problem
by exploiting changes in residency training requirements for immigrant physicians within states over time,
finding that states that impose more stringent requirements receive fewer immigrant physicians.
We add to this literature in three ways. First, the nature of the policy change which affected nurses
but not other health workers permits us to estimate triple difference models, which control for time-varying
sources of demand for health care workers that may happen to correlate with NLC adoption. Second, we
study a very recent policy change, whereas most of the literature relies on data from forty years ago, when
labor market institutions and structures may have been quite different. Finally, we examine nurses, who
are the second largest licensed profession behind teachers (Kleiner 2000) and whose supply and geographic
distribution are targets of extensive policy deliberation.
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2.4 Empirical Approach
2.4.1 Data and Samples
We analyze nurses and other health care workers surveyed in the public use micro surveys of the 1990 and
2000 U.S. Census and the 2006 to 2012 American Community Survey (ACS).5 The ACS is an ongoing survey
that provides yearly information about communities in the years between the Decennial Censuses. Detailed
information is collected about age, sex, race, income, education, where one works, commuting distance,
where one lives, as well as occupation. The Census data provides similar information, albeit on a ten-year
basis and for much larger samples. While the ACS helps provide additional information in the years when
states are joining the NLC, the Census data helps to provide more data points before the advent of the NLC.
Both identify Registered Nurses and Licensed Practical Nurses, who are also subject to the NLC, helping to
give us a more complete picture in regards to the impact of the NLC.
Our data include all workers in health occupations, including nurses, physicians, medical assistants, home
health aids, and several other smaller occupational categories. Non-nurse health care workers are not subject
to the Nurse Licensure Compact but work in similar settings and thus are a good control group with which
to compare RNs and LPNs. Locational information allow us to identify whether an individual lives and/or
works in a compact state as well as whether they live in an MSA that crosses state lines. Figure 2.3 shows
the percentages of nurses and other health workers living in a compact state over our sample period. Our
sample includes 1.5 million health workers, about one third of which are nurses.
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics on our full sample of nurses and all health workers across all years,
separately by compact status and border or non-border crossing MSA residence. Across all states and years,
3-4% of nurses and other health workers commute across state lines to work, with an average travel time of
23 to 24 minutes. Cross-state commuting and travel time are both higher among workers living in Compact
states. Unsurprisingly, residents of MSAs that cross state lines are much more likely to commute across
state lines to work, with the average rising to 8% for all health workers and 9% for nurses. Approximately
87-88% of the nurses in the sample are currently in the labor force, with 98% of those who are labor force
participants currently employed. In addition, there is very little variation in these samples across states
that are part of the compact and those that are not nor those areas that are border MSAs and non-border
MSAs. These labor force numbers are similar for all health workers as well, with 86-87% (depending on
the locational restriction) currently in the labor force. Of those health workers in the labor force, 97% are
currently employed.
5We also estimate some models using the National Sample Survey of Registered Nurses (NSSRN) for years 1980-2008. This
data does not allow us to compare nurses to other health workers, which we find is important. Thus we only present results
from analysis using NSSRN in the Appendix, Section 2.7.3 (Table 2.16).
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2.4.2 Identification Strategy and Specification
The raw summary statistics suggest that workers, particularly nurses, are more mobile when the NLC is
in place. However, this raw correlation is unlikely to provide a good estimate of the causal effect of the policy
on worker mobility. Time trends, state characteristics, worker characteristics, or labor market shocks that
happen to correlate with the presence of the NLC are likely to bias estimates of its effect. To address these,
we exploit the fact that states adopted the NLC at different times and that it only pertained to nurses.
Our first approach is to compare changes in labor force participation and commuting patterns of nurses
between states that adopted the NLC with those that did not during the same time period. We begin by
estimating simple difference-in-difference models on the sample of registered and licensed practical nurses
using regressions of the form:
Yist = β0 + β1Compactst + βzZst + βxXist + γs + γt + ist (2.1)
Our dependent variable, Yist, is one of three outcomes: 1) an indicator for whether individual i residing in
state s during year t works in a different state; 2) the average time individual i residing in state s during year
t spends commuting each day; and 3) an indicator for whether individual i residing in state s during year t
is in the labor force.6 Compactst is an indicator for whether state s is a compact state in year t. Aggregate
time trends in the prevalence of cross-state commuting and employment are accounted for by year fixed
effects γt. Location fixed effects control for average differences in commuting and employment prevalence
across areas that may be related to the adoption of the NLC. For instance, states that typically have many
nurses commuting across the border may have a greater incentive to join the compact. Where necessary,
our location fixed effects are either state fixed-effects or Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) fixed-effects.
In some specifications, we also control for time-varying state Zst and individual Xist characteristics, such
as economic conditions and worker demographics that may influence commuting patterns and also happen
to correlate with adoption of the compact. The coefficient of interest β1 is the change in share of nurses
who commute across state lines following the adoption of the NLC in their home state. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level, to address the possibility that observations within states are not independent.
The simple difference-in-differences specification assumes that outcomes for treatment and control states
would trend similarly in the absence of treatment. Labor market trends and shocks could violate this as-
sumption if, for instance, states adopt the NLC in anticipation of growing demand for nurses or as a response
to declining supply. The typical approach to ruling out this form of violation is to look for evidence of dif-
6We are also in the process of examining the differences between working in a different state versus working in a different
state that is a member of the NLC. This analysis is ongoing and the results are available upon request.
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ferential trends between Compact and non-Compact states before the former enact the NLC. Unfortunately
we do not have enough high frequency data to evaluate pre-trends. However, several features of the NLC
naturally facilitate variations on the basic specification to probe the validity of this main identifying assump-
tion. Most importantly, we exploit the fact that only nurses (registered and licensed vocational/practical)
are affected by the compact while other health professionals (physicians, medical assistants, etc.) are not to
construct a triple difference estimator. We first estimate (1) on the sample of non-nurse health workers and
test whether there is any “effect” on these workers when there should not be.7 We then explicitly use these
workers as a control group, and estimate the following model of the form:
Yist = β0 + β1Compactst + β2Nurseist + β3Compactst ∗Nurseist
+ βzZst + βxXist + γs + γt + ist (2.2)
The coefficient on Compactst captures any change in commuting patterns among non-nurse health care work-
ers that are correlated with NLC adoption. The coefficient on the interaction term captures the differential
impact on nurses and is our coefficient of interest. Like in equation (2.1) the dependent variable, Yist, is
one of the same three outcomes. This specification controls for any time-varying labor market shocks that
similarly affect nurses and other health care workers.
We also explore whether commuting patterns may differ between those who live in MSAs versus those
that who live in areas that are not assigned to an MSA. Given that MSAs are centered on an urban area,
those not assigned to an MSA are likely in a rural area. Thus, we stratify our data by residents living in an
MSA and those not living in an MSA and re-estimate equation (2.1). Lastly, the compact is most useful to
(and commuting is most common for) residents that live close to state borders. Thus in some specifications
we estimate (1) separately for residents of border and non-border MSAs. If the population of areas at
the interior of states grew at a faster rate than those near the border, this would naturally depress the
observed commuting rate. 8 As a variant on this, we also estimate a modified version of equation (2.2) that
further interacts Compactst ∗Nurseist with an indicator for whether the individual i lives in a border MSA
Compactst ∗Nurseist ∗BorderMSAst, pooling all people who live in MSAs. These results are presented in
the Appendix, Section 2.7.2.
Since occupational licensing regimes are not experimentally assigned, there are several remaining threats
to identification that confound estimates of the effect of NLC participation. First, it is possible that other
policies are adopted simultaneously with the NLC that only impact nurse labor markets (but not other
7These results are available upon request.
8We are currently working on identifying residents of counties on state borders, as another way of focusing on workers likely
to be most impacted by the policy.
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health workers). We are not aware of any such policies, but cannot rule this out. Second, our approach
takes residency location decisions as exogenous. If the NLC also impacts where nurses choose to live, our
estimates may confound true causal effects with changes in the composition of nurses who work in compact
states.
2.5 Results
Tables 2.2-2.4 present results for the effect of the NLC on our three outcome variables, with each specifi-
cation with varying amounts of control variables. We first examine the impact on nurses exclusively. Column
(2) includes year fixed-effects only, Column (3) includes state fixed effects, and Column (4) includes year and
state FE, which is our basic difference-in-difference estimate. Column (5) adds in our full set of demographic
control variables to control for any changes in the composition of nurses. Each of these regressions helps
break down how the inclusion of control variables affects our coefficient of interest. In each of these tables,
we see that the addition of year FE decreases our coefficient on living in a compact state. This implies that
our initial coefficient in column (1) was biased upward due to commuting and labor force participation trends
increasing over time. When state FE are included, our coefficient becomes more positive and significant,
suggesting that states adopting the NLC have lower commute rates and worse labor markets than states
that do not. Finally specification (4) is our main difference-in-differences specification. These results imply
that as a state switches from being a non-Compact state to a Compact state, the probability of working in
a different state, commuting times, and labor force participation all decrease. Adding demographic controls
(specification 5) has little impact on this finding, suggesting that worker composition does not change dra-
matically when the NLC is adopted. To summarize, the basic difference-in-difference results suggest that
NLC adoption is actually associated with lower levels of cross-state commuting, and labor force participation.
The basic difference-in-difference estimates in Tables 2.2-2.4 are biased if nurses are subject to other policy
or labor market shocks or trends that coincide with NLC adoption. To address this source of bias, Table 2.5
presents triple difference estimates (equation 2.2) for all three outcomes. The odd columns repeat our final
difference-in-difference estimates including full controls (year FE, state FE, and the full set of demographic
controls).9 The even columns present triple difference estimates, using non-nurse health workers as a within-
state control group that should be unaffected by NLC adoption. When we expand our identification strategy
to include all health workers and look at the interaction between living in a compact state and being a nurse
(Column (2)), our coefficient on cross-state commuting becomes positive although it is still statistically and
economically insignificant. Specifically, our result indicates that nurses who live in a Compact state are
9Note that the rest of the results that we discuss in this section reflect the same specifications discussed in Table 2.5.
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0.14% more likely to work in a different state than other health professionals. In addition, this result implies
that the coefficient on equation (2.1) is biased downward as those states that join the NLC have shorter
commuting patterns in general. The results in columns (3) and (4) also support this assessment, as the
coefficient on Compact State is negative in column (3) indicating nurses in compact states commute 0.25 of
a minute less than those nurses that do not live in a compact state. Our triple difference results in Column
(4), however, show that nurses who live in a compact state commute 1.08 minutes more (significant at the
1% level) than other health workers living in the same state when the NLC is adopted.
Columns (5) and (6) labor force participation probabilities. We may think that the Compact would
encourage nurses to more actively search for jobs as the Compact should increase the amount of jobs available
to a nurse. Our estimates imply that nurses who live in a compact state are actually less likely to participate
in the labor force; however these results are very small in magnitude especially when compared to the mean
labor force level.
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 present the results of equations (2.1) and (2.2) for every outcome for the sample of
nurses and health workers but restricts the sample to those living in an MSA and those who are not assigned
to an MSA, respectively. The results in both tables support the belief that workers in urban areas have
different commuting patterns than workers in rural areas. The coefficients in Panel A on both the Compact
variable (Column (1)) and the interaction term in Column (2) are negative and insignificant, indicating that
the compact has little effect on the probability of nurses working in a different state who live in an MSA.
Those not living in an MSA, however, have a positive coefficient on both the Compact variable in Column
(1) and the interaction term in Column (2). The magnitude of each coefficient represents about a half %
increase in the probability of working in a different state following the introduction of the compact in the
nurse’s home state (in comparison to other health workers). This magnitude is large in comparison to the
mean of the outcome variable which is about 4%.
The results for commuting time follow a slightly different pattern than when examining the probability
of working in a different state. That is, nurses who live in a compact state and don’t live in an MSA see
a smaller effect on commuting time than those nurses who live in an MSA, despite being more likely to
work in an entirely different state. To be specific, the triple difference estimate suggests that living in a
Compact State increases commuting time by 0.95 minutes following the compact (significant at 95% level)
while nurses living in a non-MSA see an increase in commuting time of .3 min (insignificant). This result
is intuitive, however, as commuting time is measured in minutes and workers in MSAs are more likely to
be driving smaller distances yet hitting more traffic than workers in rural areas who are potentially driving
further yet spending less time in the car.
The effects of the compact on labor force participation for MSAs and non-MSAs are similar to those
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found when not stratifying by location (see Table 2.5). The magnitudes of the coefficient of the Compact
variable (Columns (5)) is negative and very small compared to the mean (about 1% in comparison to a
mean outcome of 87%). The coefficient on the interaction term (Columns (6)) is almost zero. Both of these
results indicate very little, if not, a negative effect on labor force participation that is attributable to the
introduction of the Compact.
Tables 2.8 and 2.9 presents the results of estimating equations (2.1) and (2.2) but separates nurses and
health workers into those who live in MSAs that cross state lines (Border MSAs, Table 2.8) and those that
do not (Non-Border MSAs, Table 2.9). The results of those living in border MSAs vs. those living in
non-Border MSAs are different. Those nurses living in non-Border MSAs, i.e. those in less of a position
to take advantage of the compact, are less likely to work in a different state following the introduction of
the compact in their home state (significant at the 1% level). Nurses, however, living in border MSAs are
1.3% more likely to work in a different state following the introduction of the compact in their home state
(statistically insignificant, but a large magnitude given a mean of 7.8%).
The effect of the compact on the commuting time of nurses is positive and statistically significant for
nurses living in both border and non-border MSAs. (Columns (3) and (4)). This coefficient on the interaction
term in Column (4) implies that the compact has increased commuting time more for nurses who live in a
compact state than for other health workers. Furthermore, the effect on commuting time in border MSAs
is much larger than for nurses in non-border MSAs (2.32 minutes vs. 0.45 minutes), with the border MSA
result equating to an increase that is just under 10% of the mean (27.1 minutes).
Like our other specifications, the compact does not appear to affect labor force participation of nurses
living in either border or non-border MSAs. This is again consistent with the result seen when looking at
MSAs as a whole. In other words, there is little difference between labor force participation following the
introduction of the compact between nurses living in border and non-border MSAs.
2.5.1 Robustness Checks
Since 1990 is relatively far in advance of the introduction of the Nurse Licensure Compact, it may
not provide an accurate pre-NLC trend of commuting or labor force participation patterns in the U.S.
As a robustness check, we re-estimated equations (2.1) and (2.2) for all of our location stratifications but
excluding census year 1990. The results are presented in the Appendix, Section 2.7.1. Generally, the results
stay same as the before, specifically for the outcomes regarding working in a different state and labor force
participation. When stratifying the data by those workers who live in an MSA, live in a border MSA, and live
in a non-border MSA, the results for equation (2.1) do change for commuting times (Column (3) of Tables
2.11, 2.13, and 2.14). These changes, however, are small and statistically and economically insignificant.
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As mentioned in Section 2.4, we also estimate a modified version of equation (2.2) and using the following
quadruple difference specification for individual i living in state s in year t :
Yist = β0 + β1Compactst + β2Nurseist + β3BorderMSAst + β4Compactst ∗Nurseist+
β5Compactst ∗BorderMSAst + β6Nurseist ∗BorderMSAist+
β7Compactst ∗Nurseist ∗BorderMSAst + βzZst + βxXist + γs + γt + ist (2.3)
where Compactst ∗Nurseist ∗BorderMSAst is the interaction of whether nurse i lives in a border MSA in
year t and a compact state s in year t. The key identifying assumption is that the NLC should have zero
impact on workers in MSAs that do not encompass multiple states. These results are presented in Table 2.15.
The coefficient on the interaction term Compactst ∗ Nurseist ∗ BorderMSAst is positive and statistically
significant. The result suggests that Nurses who live in a Compact State and also in a Border MSA work
in a different state 2.8% points than those health workers and nurses that do not meet these criteria. This
result is very large as the mean % of health workers who work in a different state is less than 3%. On the
other hand, when we estimate equation (2.3) for commuting times, the result becomes negative and highly
insignificant. We view this analysis as somewhat speculative because there are some MSAs classified as
non-border MSAs (because they do not straddle multiple states) that are clearly within commuting distance
of another state. This will tend to bias our estimates from this quadruple difference downwards.
2.6 Conclusion
The Nurse Licensure Compact was first introduced in 1999 and allows Registered Nurses and Licensed
Practical Nurses with licenses in one NLC-member state to practice in other NLC states without obtaining a
separate license for that state. The Compact was created with the intention of providing greater mobility for
nurses, clarifying the authority to practice for nurses currently engaged in telenursing or interstate practice,
improving access to nursing care in general and during a disaster or other times of great need, and enhancing
information-sharing among member NLC states While only three states joined the Compact in its first year,
currently 24 states are now members and a few more have pending legislation.
In this chapter, we use data from the American Community Survey and the U.S. Census for years 1990-
2012 to estimate the effects of the Compact on commuting patterns and labor force outcomes. In comparison
to other health workers who were not affected by the compact, we do find some evidence that the mobility
of nurses increases following the adoption of the Compact in the nurses’ home state. Specifically, nurses that
live in a border MSA (metropolitan areas that cross multiple state lines) see a 1.2 percentage point increase
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in the probability of living in one state and working in another state following their home state joining the
Compact. Similarly, we also find that commuting times of these same nurses increase by approximately
2.32 minutes. We find no effect of the Compact labor force participation of nurses. Thus the reduction of
licensing barriers on cross-state mobility appears to widen the geographic reach of the nurse labor market.
While this is the first study to empirically look at the effect of the Nurse Licensure Compact, we recognize
that this is a first step in fully identifying the labor market effects of the Nurse Licensure Compact. Our
results indicate that the effects are concentrated in Border MSAs, yet there are likely other nurses in non-
Border MSAs in the Compact state that are affected that we fail to accurately separate from other non-Border
MSA residents (e.g. MSAs that are on the “border” of a state, yet do not cross state lines).
Finally, we test just one of the expected impacts of the Compact. As discussed, the Compact was
introduced with the intention of creating other benefits besides increasing nurse mobility. To get a fuller
picture of the effect of the Compact, it would be necessary to empirically test the whether access to care
increased following the adoption of the Compact in a patient’s home state, and how this has affected the
prevalence and scope of telenursing throughout the United States.
The implications of our results for licensing and health care policy are three-fold. First, it does appear
that state-specific licensing creates labor market frictions that reduce the geographic scope of the nurse labor
market. This may be inefficient if it prevents the workforce from being allocated to areas of highest need.
Though we focus on nurses, the same may be true of many other licensed professionals, such as lawyers,
therapists, physicians and teachers. Nationalized licensing, which the NLC is mimicking, will reduce these
geographic barriers and thus increase efficiency. From a health care perspective, our results offer a mixed
bag. On one hand, reducing licensing barriers will likely increase the pool of workers from which hospitals
draw, perhaps enabling them to better fill specific needs. On the other, it does not appear that the NLC
brings new nurses into the labor force, so a reduction in licensing barriers is not a solution to a shortage of
nurses in the aggregate.
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Figure 2.1: Nurse Licensure Compact States, 2000 to 2008
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Figure 2.2: Is a Nurse Eligible for A Multi-State License?
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Figure 2.3: Nurses and Other Health Workers Living in A Compact State
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Nurses and All Health Workers
Nurses only (Census and ACS) All health workers (Census and ACS)
Part of Never in Border Non-Border Part of Never in Border Non-Border
All States Compact Compact MSA MSA All States Compact Compact MSA MSA
Share of workers who
Work in State of Residence 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.91 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.92 0.99
Work in a Different State 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.01
Employed* 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
In the Labor Force 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.86
Average Travel Time to Work 24.13 24.89 23.97 26.47 23.24 23.37 23.56 23.33 27.10 22.64
Individual characteristics
Female 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.81 0.83 0.80 0.79 0.80
Registered nurse 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30
Licensed vocational/practical nurse 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.07
Educational Categories
High School Degree or Less 0.25 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.24 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.38 0.40
Some College 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.27 0.32 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.16 0.20
College Degree 0.31 0.34 0.30 0.37 0.33 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.22
Post-College Education 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.18
Race Categories
White 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.70 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.66 0.76
Black 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.18 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.21 0.12
American Indian 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Asian 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.07
Other Race 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Observations 550,643 85,432 465,211 83,690 294,556 1,547,920 248,704 1,299,216 234,967 799,650
Number of states 51 24 27 22 29 51 24 27 22 29
The share of workers who are employed is conditional on being in the labor force.
The share of workers who work in a different state or in their state of residence is conditional on being employed
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Table 2.2: Effects of the Nurse Licensure Compact (NLC) on Probability of Working in a Different State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Works in a Different State
Compact State Resident 0.0122 0.0118 0.0040* -0.0016 -0.0015
(0.0130) (0.0141) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Constant 0.0319*** 0.0291*** 0.0341*** 0.0284*** 0.0272***
(0.0065) (0.0058) (0.0006) (0.0017) (0.0082)
Observations 484,534 484,534 484,534 484,534 484,534
R-squared 0.0009 0.0009 0.0365 0.0367 0.0375
Sample All Nurses All Nurses All Nurses All Nurses All Nurses
Year FE No Yes No Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Controls None None None None Full
Y mean 0.0347 0.0347 0.0347 0.0347 0.0347
Table 2.3: Effects of the Nurse Licensure Compact (NLC) on Log Commuting Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Commuting Time
Compact State Resident -0.0129 -0.0419 0.0828*** -0.0085 -0.0087
(0.0283) (0.0300) (0.0081) (0.0077) (0.0078)
Constant 2.9926*** 2.8401*** 2.9665*** 2.8368*** 2.6692***
(0.0157) (0.0140) (0.0022) (0.0052) (0.0339)
Observations 480,234 480,234 480,234 480,234 480,234
R-squared 0.0001 0.0049 0.0180 0.0218 0.0266
Sample All Nurses All Nurses All Nurses All Nurses All Nurses
Year FE No Yes No Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Controls None None None None Full
Y mean 2.9699 2.9699 2.9699 2.9699 2.9699
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: All regressions in tables 2.2 and 2.3 are weighted using ACS person weights and standard errors are
clustered at the State Level. Each regression includes controls for Sex, Race, Education, Age, and Age2. In
tables 2.2 and 2.3, the sample is restricted to workers currently employed.
61
Table 2.4: Effects of the Nurse Licensure Compact (NLC) on Labor Force Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
In Labor Force
Compact State Resident 0.0056* -0.0048* 0.0269*** -0.0105** -0.0116***
(0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0056) (0.0047) (0.0038)
Constant 0.8886*** 0.8701*** 0.8828*** 0.8698*** 0.3136***
(0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0131)
Observations 582,543 582,543 582,543 582,543 582,543
R-squared 0.0001 0.0031 0.0011 0.0038 0.1318
Sample All Nurses All Nurses All Nurses All Nurses All Nurses
Year FE No Yes No Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Controls None None None None Full
Y mean 0.8708 0.8708 0.8708 0.8708 0.8708
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: All regressions are weighted using ACS person weights and standard errors are clustered at the
State Level. Each regression includes controls for Sex, Race, Education, Age, and Age2.
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Table 2.5: Effects of the NLC on Nurses and Health Workers: No Location Restrictions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Works in a Different Commuting In Labor
State Time Force
Compact State Resident -0.0015 -0.0005 -0.0087 -0.0163* -0.0116*** -0.0083**
(0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0078) (0.0089) (0.0038) (0.0034)
Nurse 0.0060*** 0.0560*** 0.0242***
(0.0019) (0.0126) (0.0014)
Compact State Resident * Nurse 0.0014 0.0397*** -0.0018
(0.0034) (0.0142) (0.0029)
Male 0.0092*** 0.0086*** 0.0582*** 0.0223*** 0.0197*** 0.0394***
(0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0093) (0.0056) (0.0017) (0.0017)
White -0.0056 -0.0040 -0.0364*** -0.0682*** 0.0024 0.0105**
(0.0076) (0.0050) (0.0133) (0.0185) (0.0036) (0.0041)
Black -0.0013 -0.0032 0.0701*** 0.0575** 0.0089** 0.0141***
(0.0079) (0.0060) (0.0240) (0.0231) (0.0043) (0.0048)
American Indian 0.0141 0.0055 -0.0197 -0.0836** -0.0270** -0.0123
(0.0087) (0.0053) (0.0345) (0.0324) (0.0102) (0.0078)
Other -0.0013 -0.0029 -0.0097 0.0011 -0.0004 0.0094***
(0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0316) (0.0379) (0.0039) (0.0025)
High School Degree or Less -0.0022* 0.0000 -0.0294*** -0.0085 -0.0183*** -0.0058***
(0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0029) (0.0014)
College Degree 0.0045 0.0056** 0.0432*** 0.0601*** 0.0104*** 0.0157***
(0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0074) (0.0072) (0.0016) (0.0014)
Post-College Education 0.0091*** 0.0084** 0.0744*** 0.0203** 0.0167*** 0.0461***
(0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0082) (0.0098) (0.0021) (0.0018)
Age 0.0003 0.0005** 0.0084*** 0.0154*** 0.0320*** 0.0269***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0003)
Age2 -0.0000 -0.0000** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0004*** -0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant 0.0272*** 0.0136*** 2.6692*** 2.4874*** 0.3136*** 0.3724***
(0.0082) (0.0049) (0.0339) (0.0269) (0.0131) (0.0083)
Observations 484,534 1,263,406 480,234 1,243,432 582,543 1,547,788
R-squared 0.0375 0.0332 0.0266 0.0355 0.1318 0.0845
Sample All Nurses All Health All Nurses All Health All Nurses All Health
Y mean 0.0347 0.0313 2.9699 2.9209 0.8708 0.8620
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: All regressions have year fixed effects and state fixed effects included. The regressions are weighted using ACS person weights and standard
errors are clustered at the State Level. Each regression includes only the controls listed above. The odd numbered columns are the sample of
registered nurses and licensed practical nurses (”All Nurses”) and the even numbered columns are the sample of health workers including nurses
(”All Health”). In columns (1)-(4), the sample is restricted to workers currently employed.
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Table 2.6: Effects of the NLC on Nurses and Health Workers Living in MSAs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Works in a Different Commuting In Labor
State Time Force
Compact State Resident -0.0078 -0.0057 -0.0072 -0.0194* -0.0107*** -0.0098***
(0.0119) (0.0088) (0.0096) (0.0110) (0.0038) (0.0033)
Nurse 0.0052*** 0.0416*** 0.0249***
(0.0014) (0.0131) (0.0015)
Compact State Resident * Nurse -0.0021 0.0335** 0.0003
(0.0031) (0.0152) (0.0025)
Constant 0.0275*** 0.0165*** 2.6862*** 2.5264*** 0.3090*** 0.3779***
(0.0094) (0.0049) (0.0349) (0.0195) (0.0109) (0.0067)
Observations 314,830 844,958 312,013 831,428 378,229 1,034,563
R-squared 0.0900 0.0806 0.0517 0.0575 0.1265 0.0800
Sample All Nurses All Health All Nurses All Health All Nurses All Health
Y mean 0.0275 0.0258 2.9898 2.9593 0.8724 0.8635
Table 2.7: Effects of the NLC on Nurses and Health Workers Living in Non-MSAs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Works in a Different Commuting In Labor
State Time Force
Compact State Resident 0.0052 0.0033 -0.0278* -0.0258 -0.0099** 0.0009
(0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0149) (0.0164) (0.0040) (0.0052)
Nurse 0.0081*** 0.1051*** 0.0238***
(0.0018) (0.0067) (0.0022)
Compact State Resident * Nurse 0.0053 0.0103 -0.0050
(0.0040) (0.0115) (0.0035)
Constant 0.0272*** 0.0086 2.5723*** 2.3045*** 0.3220*** 0.3597***
(0.0091) (0.0059) (0.0498) (0.0417) (0.0157) (0.0121)
Observations 169,704 418,448 168,221 412,004 204,314 513,225
R-squared 0.0278 0.0243 0.0314 0.0441 0.1451 0.0971
Sample All Nurses All Health All Nurses All Health All Nurses All Health
Y mean 0.0481 0.0425 2.9329 2.8436 0.8679 0.8592
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: The regressions in Table 2.6 have year fixed effects and MSA fixed effects included. The regressions
in Table 2.7 have year fixed effect and state fixed effects included. The regressions are weighted using ACS
person weights and standard errors are clustered at the MSA Level. Each regression includes controls for
Sex, Race, Education, Age, and Age2. The odd numbered columns are the sample of registered nurses and
licensed practical nurses (”All Nurses”) and the even numbered columns are the sample of health workers
including nurses (”All Health”). In columns (1)-(4), the sample is restricted to workers currently employed.
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Table 2.8: Effects of the NLC on Nurses and Health Workers Living in Border MSAs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Works in a Different Commuting In Labor
State Time Force
Compact State Resident -0.0308 -0.0355 -0.0145 -0.0523** -0.0079 -0.0020
(0.0474) (0.0339) (0.0239) (0.0221) (0.0075) (0.0070)
Nurse 0.0149*** -0.0100 0.0237***
(0.0048) (0.0305) (0.0039)
Compact State Resident * Nurse 0.0128 0.0830** -0.0057
(0.0098) (0.0334) (0.0047)
Constant 0.0992*** 0.0409** 2.9076*** 2.6459*** 0.3354*** 0.3975***
(0.0332) (0.0184) (0.0642) (0.0254) (0.0269) (0.0116)
Observations 69,862 192,233 69,253 189,512 83,685 234,953
R-squared 0.0598 0.0616 0.0407 0.0564 0.1197 0.0770
Sample All Nurses All Health All Nurses All Health All Nurses All Health
Y mean 0.0871 0.0784 3.0783 3.0825 0.8758 0.8668
Table 2.9: Effects of the NLC on Nurses and Health Workers Living in Non-Border MSAs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Works in a Different Commuting In Labor
State Time Force
Compact State Resident -0.0006 0.0007 -0.0043 -0.0046 -0.0110** -0.0107***
(0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0090) (0.0067) (0.0046) (0.0027)
Nurse 0.0017** 0.0596*** 0.0254***
(0.0007) (0.0040) (0.0014)
Compact State Resident * Nurse -0.0025* 0.0150* 0.0014
(0.0013) (0.0079) (0.0027)
Constant 0.0060 0.0081*** 2.6205*** 2.4901*** 0.3009*** 0.3707***
(0.0040) (0.0026) (0.0359) (0.0242) (0.0122) (0.0086)
Observations 244,968 652,725 242,760 641,916 294,544 799,610
R-squared 0.0486 0.0413 0.0490 0.0467 0.1285 0.0810
Sample All Nurses All Health All Nurses All Health All Nurses All Health
Y mean 0.0105 0.0103 2.9646 2.9229 0.8715 0.8625
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: All regressions have year fixed effects and MSA fixed effects included. The regressions are weighted
using ACS person weights and standard errors are clustered at the MSA Level. Each regression includes
controls for Sex, Race, Education, Age, and Age2. The odd numbered columns are the sample of registered
nurses and licensed practical nurses (”All Nurses”) and the even numbered columns are the sample of
health workers including nurses (”All Health”). In columns (1)-(4), the sample is restricted to workers
currently employed.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Effects of the Nurse Licensure Compact: Years 2000-2012
Table 2.10: Effects of the NLC on Nurses and Health Workers, No Location Restrictions: 2000-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Works in a Different Commuting In Labor
State Time Force
Compact State Resident -0.0002 0.0011 -0.0066 -0.0171** -0.0133*** -0.0078*
(0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0080) (0.0075) (0.0043) (0.0043)
Nurse 0.0063*** 0.0568*** 0.0263***
(0.0021) (0.0131) (0.0015)
Compact State Resident * Nurse 0.0012 0.0401*** -0.0044
(0.0035) (0.0144) (0.0028)
Constant 0.0332*** 0.0187*** 2.8489*** 2.6544*** 0.3700*** 0.4220***
(0.0076) (0.0043) (0.0355) (0.0253) (0.0138) (0.0081)
Observations 375,059 1,016,980 371,362 998,976 450,916 1,255,987
R-squared 0.0373 0.0328 0.0234 0.0337 0.1292 0.0820
Sample All Nurses All Health All Nurses All Health All Nurses All Health
Y mean 0.0360 0.0317 3.0046 2.9481 0.8720 0.8585
Table 2.11: Effects of the NLC on Nurses and Health Workers Living in MSAs: 2000-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Works in a Different Commuting In Labor
State Time Force
Compact State Resident -0.0069 -0.0058 0.0026 -0.0161* -0.0126*** -0.0090**
(0.0172) (0.0113) (0.0111) (0.0087) (0.0043) (0.0040)
Nurse 0.0056*** 0.0437*** 0.0272***
(0.0015) (0.0134) (0.0016)
Compact State Resident * Nurse -0.0024 0.0329** -0.0023
(0.0033) (0.0154) (0.0025)
Constant 0.0343*** 0.0238*** 2.8571*** 2.6848*** 0.3620*** 0.4265***
(0.0091) (0.0058) (0.0434) (0.0194) (0.0117) (0.0069)
Observations 240,565 671,046 238,161 658,919 289,335 829,750
R-squared 0.0878 0.0786 0.0498 0.0568 0.1246 0.0778
Sample All Nurses All Health All Nurses All Health All Nurses All Health
Y mean 0.0284 0.0257 3.0221 2.9841 0.8724 0.8588
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: The regressions in Table 2.11 have year fixed effects and MSA fixed effects included. The regressions
in Table 2.10 have year fixed effect and state fixed effects included. The regressions are weighted using
ACS person weights, standard errors are clustered at the MSA Level, and include controls for Sex, Race,
Education, Age, and Age2. In columns (1)-(4), the sample is restricted to workers currently employed.
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Table 2.12: Effects of the NLC on Nurses and Health Workers Living in Non-MSAs: 2000-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Works in a Different Commuting In Labor
State Time Force
Compact State Resident 0.0049 0.0046 -0.0348** -0.0345* -0.0076 0.0039
(0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0164) (0.0186) (0.0050) (0.0060)
Nurse 0.0079*** 0.1020*** 0.0257***
(0.0019) (0.0069) (0.0024)
Compact State Resident * Nurse 0.0056 0.0156 -0.0073*
(0.0041) (0.0115) (0.0037)
Constant 0.0219** 0.0060 2.8337*** 2.6197*** 0.3884*** 0.4172***
(0.0104) (0.0069) (0.0512) (0.0467) (0.0163) (0.0119)
Observations 134,494 345,934 133,201 340,057 161,581 426,237
R-squared 0.0287 0.0249 0.0276 0.0408 0.1413 0.0941
Sample All Nurses All Health All Nurses All Health All Nurses All Health
Y mean 0.0495 0.0433 2.9733 2.8784 0.8711 0.8580
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: All regressions have year fixed effect and state fixed effects included. The regressions are weighted
using ACS person weights, standard errors are clustered at the MSA Level, and include controls for Sex,
Race, Education, Age, and Age2. In columns (1)-(4), the sample is restricted to workers currently
employed.
Table 2.13: Effects of the NLC on Nurses and Health Workers Living in Border MSAs: 2000-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Works in a Different Commuting In Labor
State Time Force
Compact State Resident -0.0208 -0.0305 0.0045 -0.0392* -0.0110 -0.0012
(0.0597) (0.0404) (0.0319) (0.0214) (0.0067) (0.0075)
Nurse 0.0156*** -0.0092 0.0263***
(0.0049) (0.0310) (0.0045)
Compact State Resident * Nurse 0.0122 0.0825** -0.0085
(0.0100) (0.0338) (0.0051)
Constant 0.1072*** 0.0515** 3.1267*** 2.8134*** 0.3896*** 0.4435***
(0.0322) (0.0204) (0.1033) (0.0367) (0.0286) (0.0122)
Observations 52,027 149,557 51,535 147,328 62,447 185,009
R-squared 0.0555 0.0588 0.0372 0.0550 0.1199 0.0759
Sample All Nurses All Health All Nurses All Health All Nurses All Health
Y mean 0.0898 0.0776 3.1184 3.1167 0.8751 0.8609
Table 2.14: Effects of the NLC on Nurses and Health Workers Living in Non-Border MSAs: 2000-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Works in a Different Commuting In Labor
State Time Force
Compact State Resident -0.0007 0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0066 -0.0122** -0.0098***
(0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0094) (0.0067) (0.0056) (0.0035)
Nurse 0.0019*** 0.0622*** 0.0276***
(0.0007) (0.0041) (0.0015)
Compact State Resident * Nurse -0.0027** 0.0142* -0.0013
(0.0013) (0.0080) (0.0027)
Constant 0.0112** 0.0132*** 2.7798*** 2.6444*** 0.3536*** 0.4201***
(0.0045) (0.0029) (0.0356) (0.0230) (0.0133) (0.0087)
Observations 188,538 521,489 186,626 511,591 226,888 644,741
R-squared 0.0497 0.0421 0.0471 0.0455 0.1259 0.0784
Sample All Nurses All Health All Nurses All Health All Nurses All Health
Y mean 0.0115 0.0108 2.9955 2.9459 0.8717 0.8582
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: All regressions in tables 2.13 and 2.14 have year fixed effects and MSA fixed effects included. The
regressions are weighted using ACS person weights and standard errors are clustered at the MSA Level.
Each regression includes controls for Sex, Race, Education, Age, and Age2. The odd numbered columns
are the sample of registered nurses and licensed practical nurses (”All Nurses”) and the even numbered
columns are the sample of health workers including nurses (”All Health”). In columns (1)-(4), the sample
is restricted to workers currently employed.
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2.7.2 Alternative Specification: Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences
Table 2.15: Alternative Specification: Equation 2.3
(1) (2)
Works in a Commuting
Different State Time
Compact State Resident 0.0015 -0.5470*
(0.0020) (0.3311)
Nurse 0.0052*** 0.6925*
(0.0014) (0.3760)
Compact State Resident * Nurse -0.0061*** 0.9558**
(0.0019) (0.4058)
Border MSA 0.1005*** -2.4261***
(0.0261) (0.4765)
Compact * Border MSA -0.0371 -0.0818
(0.0300) (0.2816)
Compact * Border MSA * Nurse 0.0281*** -0.0085
(0.0076) (0.3308)
Constant -0.0076 5.5887***
(0.0051) (0.4394)
Observations 844,958 867,781
R-squared 0.0811 0.0477
Sample All Health All Health
Y mean 0.0258 23.6564
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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2.7.3 Effects of the Nurse Licensure Compact: Using Data from the NSSRN
Table 2.16: Summary Statistics and Basic Specification with NSSRN Data
Nurses only (NSSRN)
All states Part of Compact Never in Compact
Share of workers who
work in state of residence 0.95 0.94 0.96
work in different state 0.05 0.06 0.04
Observations 216,411 81,612 105,431
Number of states 51 22 29
Regression Result
Different State
Lives in a Compact State -0.0057
0.0042
Observations 211,463
R-Squared 0.05
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CHAPTER III
Have the obesity employment and wage penalties disappeared?
Evidence from the NLSY, 1989-2008.
3.1 Introduction
It is no secret that the waistlines of Americans have been expanding. The obesity prevalence rate, defined
as the share of people with a Body Mass Index (BMI) of 30 or higher, has increased in the United States
from 15% in 1980 to 34.9% in 2012 (Finkelstein et al. 2003; Ogden et al. 2014). Not surprisingly given
its large medical and economic costs (Cawley and Meyerhoefer 2012 estimate that 20.6% of U.S. national
health expenditures are spent treating obesity-related illnesses), a vast literature has emerged on the causes
and consequences of obesity.
Economists, in particular, have devoted a great deal of attention to the labor market consequences of
obesity, namely wages and, to a more limited extent, employment. In theory, obesity can negatively affect
employment and wages for at least three, non mutually exclusive reasons: first, employers might be reluctant
to hire obese workers because these might have lower productivity; second, employers who provide health
insurance might be concerned about paying higher health care costs when they employ obese individuals;
third, employers might discriminate against obese persons either because they or their customers have a
distaste for interacting with them.
The economics literature has documented important labor market penalties for obese individuals in the
US, in particular white females, who have been found to suffer a wage penalty around 7.5-9 percent (Cawley
2004; Han, Norton and Stearns 2009). The evidence on the effects of weight on the employment prospects
of Americans is much more limited. Han et al. (2009) find that the probability of employment decreases
for obese white and Hispanic females. The fact that the negative consequences of weight on labor market
outcomes tend to mainly affect white females thus appears to be a consistent finding in the literature (we
offer a more detailed discussion of the literature in the next section). The literature is more mixed, however,
This chapter is co-authored with Mario Macis.
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when it comes to what explains the findings, with some authors concluding in favor of employer or consumer
distaste for obese workers (Cawley 2007; Han et al. 2009) and others pointing to the higher health care costs
Bhattacharya and Bundorf 2009).
In this chapter, we use data from the 1989-2008 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), and re-
examine the wage and employment effects of obesity. Most of the studies on the labor market consequences
of weight have been conducted with NLSY data; however, virtually all of the studies have examined the years
before 2000, and all of the studies have typically shown results from pooling all the data together. In this
chapter, we extend the data until 2008 and explicitly examine the evolution of the wage penalty over time.
Doing so is important for at least two reasons. First, documenting whether the wage penalty has changed
or remained stable over time is important in its own right. Second, as we explain below in detail, examining
their evolution over time can be used to distinguish between competing explanations for the existence of
wage and employment penalties.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. When examining the data as a whole, we find no significant
wage penalty for obese individuals. When splitting the data, however, and examining the years before 2000,
we do confirm the wage penalty documented in previous studies for obese and overweight white females. In
more recent years, however, the penalty seems to have disappeared. Similarly, we confirm a negative effect
of being obese on the employment probability of white females but only limited to the years before 2000;
after the year 2000, if anything overweight and obese white female have higher employment probabilities
compared to females of normal weight.
The disappearance of the wage penalty is inconsistent with explanations for the wage and employment
penalties based on healthcare costs. Healthcare costs related to obesity have been rising steadily in the
past decades. A 2012 report by the Robert Wood Johnson foundation suggests that the yearly medical cost
associated with obesity is between $147 billion and $210 billion and a recent study finds that these costs
could grow to as much as $550 billion in the next 15 years (Finkelstein et al. (2012). These costs, contrary
to what we find, should have worsened the employment and wage prospects of obese individuals.
The findings are, however, consistent with explanations based on weight-based discrimination against
female employees. First, theories in psychology and sociology suggest that discrimination against a certain
trait is negatively correlated with the prevalence of that trait among the relevant population (Cawley 2007),
and obesity is less prevalent among white females (30.7 percent according to Hedley et al. 2004) than among
hispanic females (34.8 percent) or black females (49 percent); this is consistent with obese and overweight
white females, but not hispanic or black, suffering employment and wage penalties in the first part of the
period we analyzed.
Second, as reported above, the prevalence of obesity has increased over time. In 2012, the total of obese
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and overweight (i.e., individuals with BMI above 25) in the United States reached 68.5 percent overall; the
figure among white females was 63.2 percent (Ogden et al. 2014). Figure 3.1 provides a map of state obesity
trends over the past 25 years. When fewer people were obese, employers’ distaste for these workers could
have led to reduced employment opportunities and lower wages. As the fraction of above-normal weight
people increased, employers (who are themselves likely to be obese) might be less inclined to discriminate
against fellow obese individuals. In other words, as “overweight” becomes the new “normal”, discrimination
is reduced or disappears.
Finally, Figure 3.1 also illustrates the non-uniformity of obesity. This lack of a uniform-trend across the
U.S. may leads to different biases towards obesity in different areas. We are able to perform a baseline test
of this explanation by estimating the wages for obese individuals in regions with relatively higher BMIs and
higher percentages of obesity versus obese individuals working in regions with lower BMIs. If this is a form
of social discrimination, we would expect those regions with a higher prevalence of obesity to discriminate
less. Our results provide evidence of this explanation as we find that obese individuals living in the regions
with the a higher percentage of obesity earn higher wages than those obese individuals in other regions.
The chapter proceeds as follows. After discussing the related literature in section 3.2, we describe the
data in section 3.3. In section 3.4, we present our empirical methods and our results. In section 3.5 we
conclude and offer directions for future research.
3.2 Related Literature
The related literature has focused on documenting the prevalence of obesity among children and adults
(Hedley et al. (2004), Ogden et al (2014)), the health care costs attributable to obesity (Finkelstein et
al, 2003; Cawley and Meyerhoefer, 2012; Ogden et al., 2014), the labor market consequences of obesity
(Register and Williams, 1990; Mitra, 2001; Cawley, 2004; Baum and Ford, 2004, Morris, 2006; Cawley, 2007;
Johansoon et al., 2007; Bhattacharya and Bundorf, 2009; Han et al., 2009), and the explanations for these
labor market effects (Hedley et al., Bhattacharya and Bundorf, 2009; Han et al., 2009; Ogden, 2014).
Research has shown a consistent wage penalty for obese women in the United States. Most of the literature
continually finds a negative correlation between obesity and wages among women and less of a penalty (if
any) for obese men. In his seminal paper, Cawley (2004) finds that a difference in weight of 64 pounds is
associated with a decrease in wages of 9% for white women. Higher healthcare costs (Bhattacharya and
Bundorf, 2009), social discrimination (Mitra, 2001; Baum and Ford, 2004) and lower productivity (Mitra,
2001) are often cited and explored as possible causes for this wage penalty.
Studies that examine the wage penalty for obesity look at years as early as 1979 (Baum and Ford, 2004)
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and as late the early 2000s (Bhattacharya and Bundorf 2009; Gregory and Ruhm, 2009). These studies
also document wage penalties and depending on the study, find that obese females experience a larger wage
penalty than obese men. Depending on their specification, they find the wage penalty for obese females to
be 1.6-2.6% larger than the penalty for obese males (Baum and Ford, 2004).
Many of the studies try to offer an explanation for this wage penalty. Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2009)
observe that among the insured, obese women earn $1.66 per hour less than non-obese women while men
earn $1.21 per hour less than non-obese men. Workers without employer-sponsored insurance see no wage
penalty. Through an examination of medical expenditure data, they conclude that $583 of the average obese
woman’s yearly wage penalty can be attributed to higher medical expenditures. Baum and Ford (2004),
on the other hand, find that obese individuals with employer-provided health insurance receive less of a
wage penalty than those obese individuals without such health insurance. Gregory and Ruhm (2009) pay
particular attention to how wages vary within different groups of people, such as white males or black females.
When examining wage functions by weight, they find that wage functions peak at much higher levels for
minorities, i.e. the highest average wage earned by a minority occurs at a weight that is much higher than
it is for white individuals. This suggests racial differences in perception of desired body weight. They also
find that white females wages peak well below the clinical cutoff for obesity. Given that health care costs
are the same for overweight (non-obese) individuals and normal weight individuals, this finding lends some
credence to the belief that this penalty is a form of social discrimination.
Much less research has been done on the consequences of obesity on employment (in comparison to the
effect on wages). Han et al. (2009) is the only study to examine employment effects in the United States.
The authors use data from the NLSY for the years 1982-1998 and find that the probability of employment
decreases with weight among white females. Other studies show some evidence of lower employment of obese
individuals in Europe (Morris, 2006; Johansson et al, 2007).
While wage and employment penalties for obese individuals are well documented, all of the aforementioned
studies focus on years prior to 2003. Although the rate of obesity has been increasing, it is not obvious from
the previous studies that this penalty would increase along with it or remain stable. In fact, if the penalty is
a form of social discrimination, as the prevalence of obesity increases, and obesity becomes the new majority,
we may even see this penalty decrease. In this chapter, we examine data from 1989-2008, which hopefully
gives us a better sense of the current labor market consequences of obesity.
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3.3 Data
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) is a nationally representative sample of 12,686
people aged 14-22 who were first surveyed in 1979. This survey continued annually until 1994 and biennially
thereafter. The NLSY contains information on wages, insurance sources, fringe benefits, height, weight,
and many other demographic characteristics, and is used among other things to analyze obesity and worker
wages. The NLSY provides a good dataset to study our question as it provides an accurate representation of
BMI trends over the sample period. Figure 3.2 shows the BMI trends of population of adults in the United
States compared with those in the NLSY. As we can see, these follow a very similar path.
Following Cawley’s (2004) and Bhattacharya and Bundorf’s (2009) lead, we construct a panel data set as
follows. First, we use the NLSY for the years 1989-2008 and are able to follow individual respondents across
those years. The year 1991 is omitted because weight was not recorded for that survey year. Therefore,
the maximum number of times an individual appears in the dataset is twelve. After accounting for attrition
throughout the years, we are left with an unbalanced panel of 103,823 observations.
Next, the sample is restricted to exclude pregnant women and observations with missing data for the key
variables, namely weight, height, and hourly wage, and those whose height and weight result in a either a
negative BMI or a BMI greater than 100. This leaves a final sample size of 95,858.
The key dependent variable, hourly wage, is top and bottom coded at $1 and $500 (Cawley, 2004). In
order to construct the BMI, we need an individual’s height and weight. While weight is recorded every
survey year, height was only measured up until 1985. Thus, we take the individuals height in 1985 and
apply it to all years in our dataset. While it might be a concern that respondents are still growing after
1985, the youngest individual at that time was 20 years old. We assume that respondents stop growing after
that. BMI is then constructed by using the regular BMI formula and we use the standard BMI cutoffs to
create indicators for different weight categories: a person with a BMI of less than 25 is considered to be of
normal weight, a BMI between 25 and 30 is classified as overweight, and a BMI greater than 30 is classified
as obese.1
Table 3.1 provides the average wage (in dollars) of each gender and race segmented by weight group.
Since our empirical strategy will focus on separating the earlier years from the later years, we present the
average wage of each group before 2002 and after 2002. If we look at the entire sample (“All”), the difference
between wages of normal weight and obese individuals have narrowed in later years. When we split the
sample up into smaller demographic groups, however, we see that this narrowing is likely driven by the large
positive wage gap between obese black males and normal weight black males: obese black males make about
1BMI is calculated by taking weight (lbs), multiplying by 703, and then dividing by height-squared (measured in inches).
Those with a BMI under 18.5 are underweight and a those with a BMI over 35 are morbidly obese.
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$4.5 more per hour. These simple tabulations provide little information and point to the need for the more
precise empirical estimation detailed in section 3.4.
We include controls for standard demographic variables, i.e. age, age2, gender, and race. We also include
controls for variables that might affect a worker’s earning potential. That is, whether there are any children
in the household, marital status, educational attainment categories, job tenure, location of residence, number
of employees at the workplace, industry category, and occupational category.2 The presence of any children
in the household, coded as a dummy variable, and its interaction with gender are also included in the
regressions to account for the idea that children have a greater impact on a female’s participation in the
workforce in comparison to men. We also include an indicator representing the quartile of a respondent’s
AFQT score. The AFQT is the armed forces qualification test. There are four components to the score:
word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, arithmetic reasoning, and mathematics knowledge. The score
is a percentile score and ranges from 0-99. We created four dummy variables to represent scoring in each
quartile. Thus, respondents who scored in the 0-25th percentile would receive a 1 for the first score dummy
variable, while those scored above the 25th percentile would receive a zero. Summary statistics for these
variables are presented in table 3.2.
3.4 Empirical Methods and Results
3.4.1 Wage Penalty
In order to examine how the wage penalty for obese individuals has changed over time we estimate the
following equation using Ordinary-Least Squares (OLS):
lnwageit = β0 + β1WeightMeasureit + βxXit + γi + γt + it (3.1)
where lnwageit is the natural log of the hourly wage of individual i in year t, Xit is a vector of individual
characteristics (age, gender, race, children, marital status, education, industry, occupation), γi is a person-
specific fixed effect, γt is a time fixed-effect, and it is the orthogonal regression error, which is clustered at
the individual level. WeightMeasureit is the weight of i in year t, where we use three different measures of
weight (Cawley, 2004): BMI, an individuals weight (controlling for height), and three different BMI category
indicators: underweight (BMI under 18.5), overweight (BMI between 30-35), and obese (BMI over 35). Each
2The industries are agriculture; forestry and fisheries; mining; construction; manufacturing; transportation, communications,
and other public utilities; wholesale trade; retail trade; finance, insurance and real estate; business and repair services; per-
sonal services; entertainment and recreation services; and public administration. Occupations are managerial and professional
specialty; technical and sales; administrative support; service; farming, forestry, and fishing; precision, production, craft, and
repair; and operators, fabricators, and laborers.
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wage equation is first estimated using OLS and then re-estimated to include individual fixed-effects. Given
the possible reverse causality of weight and wages, that is people who earn less may tend to gain weight (e.g.,
by say, eating lower-cost, unhealthier food), we assume that lagged weight is uncorrelated with the current
wage residual and follow Cawley (2004) and substitute in a 5-year lagged measure of weight. Each regression
is run for the full-time employed sample and is then segmented by gender and race. Most importantly, to
capture the changing wage penalty over time, we also run two separate regressions for years 1989-2000 and
years 2002-2008, in addition to estimating for the full sample period.
For the sake of brevity, we discuss the results of only the female groups since females (specifically white
females) are the individuals who have most consistently had a documented wage penalty attributable to
obesity. The results for the entire sample, all males, all females, white males, and black males, can be found
in the Appendix, Section 3.6.1, tables 3.20-3.25.
In table 3.3, we present the results when looking at the entire sample period of white and black females for
years 1989-2008. Columns (1), (2), (4), and (5) do not include individual fixed effects and Columns (2) and
(5) replace the weight measure with 5-year lagged weight measures. The OLS estimations indicate a wage
penalty for heavier white and black females. In addition, the coefficients on the lagged weight measures are
very similar to the non-lagged weight measures, implying that there is no reverse causality, and that current
wages have no effect on current weight. When we include fixed effects, however, most of the significance on
each coefficient disappears, including in the case of white females (table 3.3, column 3). These results are
inconsistent with the previously documented wage penalty for white females.
To more closely examine the wage penalty by year, we estimate the following two equations:
lnwageit = α+ βBefore2002it + λBMICategoryit + δBMICategoryit ∗Before2002
+ ρXit + γi + γt + it (3.2)
lnwageit = α+ βY ear + λBMICategoryit + δBMICategoryit ∗ Y ear
+ ρXit + γi + it (3.3)
where BMICategoryit is one of the three different BMI category indicators: underweight (BMI under 18.5),
overweight (BMI between 30-35), and obese (BMI over 35), Before2002it is an indicator if the year is before
2002, Y earit is a vector of years, and BMICategoryit ∗ Y ear is an interaction between each BMI category
and the year.
Table 3.4 presents the results for equation 3.2 and table 3.5 presents the results for equation 3.3. The
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results in table 3.4 show that obese white females earn 6.5% less in years before 2002 in comparison to normal
weight white females in those years. These results are the same whether looking cross-sectionally (the first
column) or within person (the second column). When examining the interaction of obese and year (table
3.5), we see that the log wage of obese white females tends to increase each year, with a large increase in
years after 2002 (i.e., years 2004, 2006, and 2008). While it may seem curious that the jump in wages is so
large for white females in years after 2002, Figure 3.3 sheds some light on this result. In this figure, we see
not only a fairly steady increase in the log wages of obese white females (the green line) but also a decrease
in the difference in wages between normal weight (the blue line) and obese white females. In other words,
while the difference in the log wage of normal weight and obese white females was quite large in 1989, this
difference has substantially decreased in later years, and sharply decreased in year 2004. This convergence
of log wages in 2004 accounts for the large positive coefficient on the interaction between obese and the year
2004 (2004* BMIObese). For the rest of the wage and employment analyses, therefore, we will separately
examine the years before 2002 and the years 2002 and later.
In table 3.6, we present the results for the years 1989-2000 only. Unlike the results for the the entire
sample, the estimates for those years most commonly examined in the obesity literature are consistent with
the wage penalty of obese white females that has been documented. Regardless of the measure of weight
is used, heavier and obese white females earn a lower wage than their thinner counterparts (coefficients are
negative and significant). This result persists when including individual fixed effects. For black females, the
wage penalty for obesity becomes insignificant when we include individual fixed-effects.
When we examine the later years of our sample, a previously unexamined time period in the obesity
literature, the coefficient on obesity for white females in the fixed-effects regression essentially becomes zero
(-0.0009; table 3.7, Column (3)). In addition, the coefficient on obesity for black females in the fixed-effect
regression (Column (6)) is also very insignificant. These results suggest that the previously documented
wage penalty for females has disappeared in recent years.
3.4.2 Employment Penalty
Next, we examine how the employment penalty has changed over time. We estimate a marginal probit
regression for the entire range of years (1989-2008), as well as years before 2000 and the years after 2000
using the full sample of employed and unemployed individuals:
Prob(Employmentit) = β0 + β1Underweightit + β2Overweightit + β3Obeseit + βxXit + γi + γt + it (3.4)
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where Employmentit is 1 if the individual works at least 1 hour per week, and Underweightit, Overweightit,
and Obeseit are the same BMI categorical indicators from the wage regressions. As before, equation (2), is
estimated for both the full sample and then stratified by both gender and race.3
The results for years 1989-2008 are in table 3.8. Similar to the wage regressions over the entire sample,
we find small and statistically insignificant coefficients on the obese indicators for every subsample. In
fact, most of these coefficients, including the one for obese white females, are positive although statistically
indistinguishable from zero. Worth noting is the employment penalty of those who fall in to the underweight
category. This is consistent for each race and gender group and points to two possible reasons: social
discrimination against those who appear “scrawny” and“weak,” and lower productivity, as those who are
clinically underweight are perhaps sicker than those who are at a healthier weight.
The results when we separate the years before 2000 and after 2000 are presented in Tables 3.9 and 3.10.
Looking at Column (1) of table 3.9, we see that obese individuals have a lower probability of employment
in comparison to “normal” weight individuals. When we disaggregate this sample, obese males and obese
females, specifically white males and females, still have a negative (but statistically insignificant) coefficient
indicating that they face an employment penalty in comparison to their normal weight counterparts. For
the years after 2000 (table 3.10), not only does this penalty disappear, but obese white females, and obese
females in general, are more likely to be employed than “normal” weight females/white females. These
results are consistent with our wage results in that they imply that the labor market penalty for obesity has
disappeared in later years.
3.4.3 Regional Analysis
We next attempt to identify the source of the decreasing wage and employment penalties of obese indi-
viduals. If the obesity penalty is due to social discrimination, then the negative effect should decrease as the
share of Americans who are overweight increases, either because firms no longer have a choice but to hire
people who are overweight, or because being overweight might become the new “normal”. In other words,
the decrease in the penalty that we see in tables 3.4, and 3.7, is due to a decrease in discrimination stemming
from the fact that the average person in the U.S. is now overweight or obese. Thus, we would expect both
the wage and employment penalties to be lower for those obese workers living in areas with high BMI. We
use the most micro locational data available, “region”, to identify which region has the highest average BMI
in each year. The NLSY identify four regions: 1.) North East, 2.) North Central, 3.) South, and 4.)
West.4 Figure 3.4 shows the trend of wages of obese individuals in regions with the highest BMI versus
3For alternative specifications, see the Appendix, Section 3.6.2, which displays the results when we redefine “employed” to
be those who work full-time.
4For a list of the states that are part of each region, see the Appendix, Section 3.6.3, table 3.29.
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obese individuals in other regions (i.e. those with relatively lower BMI). There is a clear and consistent wage
gap between obese individuals in the “High BMI” regions and those in the “Low BMI” regions, and this gap
widens in later years.
To test whether wages differ for obese individuals living in different regions of the U.S., we estimate the
following two specifications:
lnwageit = α+ βRegionWeightt + λBMICategoryit + δBMICategoryit ∗RegionWeightit
+ ρXit + γi + γt + it (3.5)
ProbEmploymentit = α+ βRegionWeightit + λBMICategoryit + δBMICategoryit ∗RegionWeightit
+ ρXit + γt + it (3.6)
where RegionWeightit can be two different measures of the relative weight of a region 1.) and indicator
equal to 1 if the individual is living in the region with the highest BMI in year t; or 2.) the percentage of
obesity in a given region in year t. The coefficient δ represents the interaction between this regional weight
measure and the different BMI Categories. We include a person-specific fixed effect for some of the anlayses
as well as region by year fixed effects where appropriate.
Tables 3.11-3.13 display the results when examining individuals living in the region with the highest BMI.
We see that for the cross-sectional specifications, obese females overall, as well as white and black females
specifically, earn higher wages in the regions with the highest BMI. For instance, obese females in the region
with the highest BMI earn about 2.0% higher wages than normal weight individuals in the same region. This
result holds when looking within-person. In addition, we see a slightly larger magnitude on this coefficient
when looking specifically at white females–the group most discriminated against (columns 5 and 5, table
3.11). Similarly, we see an increase in the probability of employment for females, specifically white obese
females, who live in a region with the highest BMI.
Simply looking at the region with the highest BMI does not provide the variation needed to control for
the year or region since this variable does not vary over time–that is, the region with the highest BMI tends
to stay the same. Therefore, we cannot rule out that some regions pay higher wages. As a result, we estimate
equations 3.5 and 3.6 using the percentage of obesity within a region, something that varies every year. This
allows us to control for each region and year in the specifications. Tables 3.14-3.16 display these results. The
results indicate that as the percentage of obesity in a region increases, the log wages of obese white females
increase as well (the cross-section and within-person coefficients are 0.34 and 0.30, respectively, significant
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at the 10% level). The same is true when examining the probability of employment. We also estimate the
same specifications and include region*year fixed-effects (tables 3.17-3.19). The results largely stay the same,
although the magnitude on the coefficient for white females when including the individual-level fixed effects
is insignificant due to the slight decrease in magnitude.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we use data from the 1989-2008 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), and re-
examine the wage and employment effects of obesity. Most of the studies on the labor market consequences
of weight have been conducted with NLSY data; however, virtually all of the studies have examined the
years before 2000, and all of the studies have typically shown results from pooling all the data together. In
this chapter, we extend the data until 2008 and explicitly examine the evolution of the wage penalty over
time. We find that the group of individuals believed to be most discriminated against, obese white females,
have seen both their wage penalty and employment penalty decrease over time.
Many papers have put forth competing explanations for this wage penalty, specifically that the wage
penalty is driven by higher health care costs for obese individuals versus the penalty as a form of social
discrimination. We offer support for the latter explanation by examining the wage penalty across regions.
We find that obese individuals who live in regions with an average higher BMI, suffer less of a wage and
employment penalty than those individuals in regions with relatively lower BMIs. Furthermore, we find that
as the percentage of obesity in a region increases, so does the wage for obese white females. In addition, our
OLS result for the earlier years do not support higher health care costs as the driving factor of the penalty
since there is an obvious wage penalty for overweight women, yet overweight people do not incur greater
medical expenditures (Finkelstein et al., 2003).
There are, of course, limitations with our studies and many avenues for future research. First, BMI is
not the best measure of obesity as there is a bias against tall people that are relatively fit. That is, tall
people who do not appear overweight to the naked eye may in fact be classified as obese and yet would be
less likely to be socially discriminated against. This bias, however, is likely consistent through out the years
and would be unlikely to change in the later years.
Second, our region measure is a crude divider of the location of obese individuals. More micro-level data
would provide better precision and could help dive further into the discriminations across areas with higher
BMIs.5
Finally, even though our results appear to support the idea that the penalty is disappearing and that
5The NLSY has detailed Geocode data, which would allow us to see the State that the respondent lives in. We are in the
process of receiving this restricted data.
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this result is consistent with a decline in social discrimination, this does not rule out the health care cost
explanation. For instance, if the penalty is limited to jobs that offer insurance, it is possible the penalty has
declined because insurance coverage has declined over time. A complete analysis would include an analysis
of the wages of jobs that do offer employer-sponsored insurance versus jobs that do not.
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Figure 3.1: U.S. State by State Obesity Trends Over Time
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Figure 3.2: BMI Trends: NLSY Statistics Compared with CDC Statistics
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Figure 3.3: Log Wages of White Females Over Time: Separated by Weight Classification
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Figure 3.4: Log Wages of Obese Individuals Living in Regions with Relatively High BMI
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Table 3.1: Average Wage (in dollars) by Gender, Race, and Weight Group
Before 2002 After 2002 Before 2002 After 2002
All White Female
Normal Weight 11.295 16.851 Normal Weight 10.729 15.790
Obese 10.075 15.051 Obese 8.249 12.802
Overweight 11.645 18.704 Overweight 9.645 15.265
Underweight 9.042 10.640 Underweight 10.170 11.992
Female White Male
Normal Weight 10.989 14.250 Normal Weight 14.597 24.270
Obese 7.309 11.973 Obese 13.659 19.976
Overweight 7.605 13.309 Overweight 14.751 24.642
Underweight 6.160 15.701 Underweight 9.341 8.315
Male Black Female
Normal Weight 11.689 16.316 Normal Weight 7.861 12.360
Obese 12.157 15.901 Obese 7.278 11.291
Overweight 11.900 17.845 Overweight 8.427 12.291
Underweight 21.943 Underweight 5.404 8.053
Black Male
Normal Weight 9.150 10.724
Obese 10.654 15.363
Overweight 9.772 16.040
Underweight 4.009 5.066
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics by Weight Group
Underweight Normal Weight Overweight Obese
Sample Size 1516 36861 34212 23269
Male 0.153 0.407 0.618 0.478
Age 33.278 34.520 36.372 37.926
Age2 1144.177 1229.947 1364.212 1478.377
Urban Residence 0.785 0.779 0.773 0.753
AFQT Score ≤ 25 0.340 0.333 0.388 0.457
25 < AFQT Score ≤ 50 0.315 0.252 0.248 0.242
50 < AFQT Score ≤ 75 0.162 0.194 0.169 0.155
75 < AFQT Score ≤ 100 0.135 0.181 0.153 0.108
Race Categories
White 0.766 0.714 0.636 0.562
Black 0.197 0.238 0.303 0.375
Other 0.037 0.048 0.062 0.063
Marital Status
Married 0.550 0.600 0.624 0.603
Never Married 0.242 0.249 0.234 0.259
Formerly Married 0.208 0.151 0.143 0.138
Education Categories
Highest Grade ≤ Grade 9 0.035 0.025 0.030 0.040
9 < Highest Grade ≤ 12 0.530 0.512 0.543 0.574
Highest Grade is 13 + 0.435 0.464 0.427 0.386
Job Characteristics
Employer size ≤ 10 0.172 0.199 0.183 0.162
10 < Employer size ≤ 25 0.115 0.113 0.114 0.109
25 < Employer size ≤ 50 0.065 0.094 0.095 0.092
50 < Employer size ≤ 1000 0.233 0.294 0.318 0.328
Employer size is 1000+ 0.084 0.097 0.093 0.087
Job Tenure ≤ 1 Year 0.251 0.221 0.198 0.178
1 < Job Tenure ≤ 3 0.197 0.215 0.207 0.193
3 < Job Tenure ≤ 6 0.144 0.173 0.168 0.159
Job Tenure is 6+ Years 0.143 0.246 0.296 0.316
Table 3.3: Log Wage Regressions of White Females and Black Females 1989-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
White Females Black Females
BMI -0.0087∗∗∗ -0.0006 -0.0037∗∗ 0.0015
(0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0013) (0.0020)
BMI (lag) -0.0081∗∗∗ -0.0045∗
(0.0018) (0.0018)
Weight (in pounds) -0.0015∗∗∗ -0.0002 -0.0006∗∗ 0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Weight (lag) -0.0014∗∗∗ -0.0008∗
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Underweight -0.0106 -0.0199 -0.0353 -0.0335
(0.0294) (0.0347) (0.0609) (0.0577)
Overweight -0.0310∗ 0.0129 0.0170 0.0486∗
(0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0192) (0.0206)
Obese -0.1194∗∗∗ -0.0183 -0.0484∗ 0.0257
(0.0189) (0.0241) (0.0209) (0.0288)
Underweight (lag) 0.0406 0.0082
(0.0388) (0.0731)
Overweight (lag) -0.0564∗∗ -0.0154
(0.0214) (0.0231)
Obese (lag) -0.0989∗∗∗ -0.0565∗
(0.0252) (0.0258)
Observations 24775 12237 24775 10765 5707 10765
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ (p < 0.05), ∗∗ (p < 0.01), ∗∗∗ (p < 0.001)
One of the three measures of weight is used: BMI, weight (controlling for height) or the three indicators
Column (2) (5) use lagged weight measures, Columns (3) (6) include individual fixed-effects
Controls for whether R has children, having children*female, marital status, age, age2, education, firm size,
job tenure, AFQT score, type of residence, industry, occupation, and year dummies are included in all regressions.
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Table 3.4: Effect of Obesity on Wages of Females Before 2001
White Females Black Females
Before 2001 -0.0253 0.1453*** -0.0900** 0.0524
(0.0278) (0.0242) (0.0366) (0.0338)
Underweight -0.0310 0.0794 0.0759 -0.0166
(0.0684) (0.0661) (0.1138) (0.0731)
Overweight 0.0158 0.0548* 0.0203 0.0500
(0.0307) (0.0280) (0.0381) (0.0384)
Obese -0.0657** 0.0217 -0.0014 0.0539
(0.0311) (0.0326) (0.0382) (0.0433)
Underweight*Before2001 0.0259 -0.1221* -0.1244 -0.0247
(0.0719) (0.0662) (0.0890) (0.0809)
Overweight*Before2001 -0.0562* -0.0588** 0.0067 0.0048
(0.0312) (0.0295) (0.0399) (0.0389)
Obese*Before2001 -0.0652** -0.0654** -0.0499 -0.0399
(0.0316) (0.0297) (0.0376) (0.0387)
Constant -0.1879 -0.3491 -0.5532 -0.7104*
(0.2296) (0.2456) (0.4885) (0.4078)
Observations 24,775 24,775 10,765 10,765
R-squared 0.3039 0.6104 0.4033 0.6503
Person FE NO YES NO YES
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: Interactions with Year and Other BMI Categories are Included but not reported. Each regression includes controls for
whether the woman has any children, marital status, age, age2, education, AFQT score, whether she lives in an urban area,
job tenure, employer size, industry and occupation.
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Table 3.5: Effect of Obesity on Wages of Females: Year by Year
White Females Black Females
Underweight 0.1236 0.1291 -0.0530 -0.0258
(0.0946) (0.1151) (0.0537) (0.0702)
Overweight -0.0920*** -0.0207 0.0062 0.0449
(0.0284) (0.0325) (0.0318) (0.0351)
Obese -0.1780*** -0.0726 -0.0680* 0.0311
(0.0404) (0.0495) (0.0354) (0.0426)
1990*BMIObese 0.0216 -0.0076 0.0050 0.0008
(0.0478) (0.0519) (0.0408) (0.0418)
1992*BMIObese 0.0702 0.0392 -0.0060 -0.0259
(0.0487) (0.0541) (0.0471) (0.0475)
1993*BMIObese -0.0012 -0.0021 0.0288 0.0025
(0.0514) (0.0545) (0.0443) (0.0456)
1994*BMIObese -0.0011 -0.0158 -0.0182 -0.0337
(0.0460) (0.0485) (0.0460) (0.0483)
1996*BMIObese 0.0497 0.0280 -0.0889* -0.0965*
(0.0471) (0.0502) (0.0494) (0.0533)
1998*BMIObese 0.0471 0.0453 0.0537 -0.0028
(0.0501) (0.0525) (0.0475) (0.0503)
2000*BMIObese 0.0364 0.0248 0.0013 -0.0024
(0.0482) (0.0512) (0.0521) (0.0550)
2002*BMIObese 0.0271 0.0264 0.0343 0.0040
(0.0502) (0.0534) (0.0575) (0.0596)
2004*BMIObese 0.1903*** 0.1716*** 0.1529** 0.0829
(0.0635) (0.0663) (0.0716) (0.0748)
2006*BMIObese 0.1244* 0.0955 -0.0183 -0.0406
(0.0721) (0.0744) (0.0744) (0.0779)
2008*BMIObese 0.0916* 0.0643 0.0911 0.0458
(0.0518) (0.0567) (0.0562) (0.0589)
Constant 1.0594*** 0.7333 0.6243 0.1972
(0.2933) (0.5606) (0.5296) (0.7188)
Observations 24,775 24,775 10,765 10,765
R-squared 0.3240 0.6160 0.4233 0.6532
Person FE NO YES NO YES
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: Interactions with year and other BMI categories are included but not reported. Each regression includes controls for whether
the woman has any children, marital status, age, age2, education, AFQT score, whether she lives in an urban area, job tenure,
employer size, industry and occupation.
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Table 3.6: Log Wage Regressions of White Females and Black Females 1989-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
White Females Black Females
BMI -0.0097∗∗∗ -0.0026 -0.0044∗∗ -0.0027
(0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0014) (0.0024)
BMI (lag) -0.0097∗∗∗ -0.0044∗
(0.0019) (0.0022)
Weight (in pounds) -0.0016∗∗∗ -0.0005 -0.0007∗∗ -0.0004
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Weight (lag) -0.0016∗∗∗ -0.0007∗
(0.0003) (0.0004)
Underweight -0.0071 -0.0384 -0.0480 -0.0001
(0.0306) (0.0374) (0.0545) (0.0664)
Overweight -0.0500∗∗ -0.0146 0.0201 0.0286
(0.0152) (0.0162) (0.0201) (0.0200)
Obese -0.1414∗∗∗ -0.0502∗ -0.0708∗∗∗ -0.0394
(0.0189) (0.0251) (0.0208) (0.0308)
Underweight (lag) -0.0003 0.0498
(0.0430) (0.0882)
Overweight (lag) -0.0750∗∗ 0.0127
(0.0228) (0.0250)
Obese (lag) -0.1191∗∗∗ -0.0568
(0.0290) (0.0310)
Observations 18008 5575 18008 7476 2485 7476
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ (p < 0.05), ∗∗ (p < 0.01), ∗∗∗ (p < 0.001)
One of the three measures of weight is used: BMI, weight (controlling for height) or the three indicators
Column (2) (5) use lagged weight measures, Columns (3) (6) include individual fixed-effects
Controls for whether R has children, having children*female, marital status, age, age2, education, firm size,
job tenure, AFQT score, type of residence, industry, occupation, and year dummies are included in all regressions.
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Table 3.7: Log Wage Regressions of White Females and Black Females 2002-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
White Females Black Females
BMI -0.0070∗∗∗ 0.0008 -0.0026 0.0025
(0.0019) (0.0040) (0.0018) (0.0051)
BMI (lag) -0.0071∗∗ -0.0045∗
(0.0022) (0.0021)
Weight (in pounds) -0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0002 -0.0004 0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0008)
Weight (lag) -0.0012∗∗ -0.0008∗
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Underweight -0.0230 0.0992 0.0869 -0.0701
(0.0699) (0.1129) (0.1238) (0.1262)
Overweight 0.0094 0.0361 0.0201 0.0151
(0.0301) (0.0405) (0.0364) (0.0516)
Obese -0.0755∗ -0.0009 -0.0066 0.0166
(0.0303) (0.0508) (0.0364) (0.0769)
Underweight (lag) 0.0833 -0.0238
(0.0549) (0.0769)
Overweight (lag) -0.0381 -0.0346
(0.0290) (0.0321)
Obese (lag) -0.0878∗∗ -0.0596
(0.0314) (0.0316)
Observations 6767 6662 6767 3289 3222 3289
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ (p < 0.05), ∗∗ (p < 0.01), ∗∗∗ (p < 0.001)
One of the three measures of weight is used: BMI, weight (controlling for height) or the three indicators
Column (2) (5) use lagged weight measures, Columns (3) (6) include individual fixed-effects
Controls for whether R has children, having children*female, marital status, age, age2, education, firm size,
job tenure, AFQT score, type of residence, industry, occupation, and year dummies are included in all regressions.
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Table 3.8: Probability of Employment 1989-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full Sample Males Females White Males Black Males White Females Black Females
Underweight (d) -0.0791∗∗∗ -0.1620∗ -0.0652∗ -0.1689 -0.1637 -0.0615∗ -0.1391∗
(0.0224) (0.0750) (0.0254) (0.0899) (0.1143) (0.0278) (0.0545)
Overweight (d) 0.0117∗ 0.0015 0.0180∗ -0.0042 0.0361∗∗ 0.0144 0.0379∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0054) (0.0081) (0.0060) (0.0125) (0.0092) (0.0128)
Obese (d) 0.0078 0.0014 0.0072 -0.0035 0.0210 0.0022 0.0141
(0.0060) (0.0068) (0.0100) (0.0076) (0.0158) (0.0120) (0.0163)
Observations 91998 45239 46759 29444 13354 30409 13693
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ (p < 0.05), ∗∗ (p < 0.01), ∗∗∗ (p < 0.001)
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Controls for whether R has children, having children*female, marital status, age, age2, education
AFQT score, type of residence, and year dummies are included in all regressions.
Table 3.9: Probability of Employment 1989-1998
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full Sample Males Females White Males Black Males White Females Black Females
Underweight (d) -0.0528∗∗ -0.1088 -0.0552∗ -0.1042 -0.1352 -0.0483 -0.1489∗∗
(0.0204) (0.0639) (0.0259) (0.0681) (0.1184) (0.0279) (0.0562)
Overweight (d) 0.0050 -0.0010 0.0052 -0.0045 0.0250∗ 0.0054 0.0226
(0.0045) (0.0036) (0.0090) (0.0040) (0.0117) (0.0103) (0.0154)
Obese (d) -0.0070 -0.0083 -0.0169 -0.0118 0.0058 -0.0256 0.0053
(0.0060) (0.0056) (0.0113) (0.0067) (0.0163) (0.0138) (0.0184)
Observations 57656 28385 29271 18616 8232 19263 8353
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ (p < 0.05), ∗∗ (p < 0.01), ∗∗∗ (p < 0.001)
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Controls for whether R has children, having children*female, marital status, age, age2, education
AFQT score, type of residence, and year dummies are included in all regressions.
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Table 3.10: Probability of Employment: 2000-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full Sample Males Females White Males Black Males White Females Black Females
Underweight (d) -0.1151∗∗ -0.2470∗ -0.0990∗ -0.2591 -0.2145 -0.1013 -0.1185
(0.0422) (0.1028) (0.0471) (0.1389) (0.1323) (0.0520) (0.0975)
Overweight (d) 0.0282∗∗ 0.0103 0.0398∗∗ 0.0016 0.0545∗ 0.0302∗ 0.0680∗∗∗
(0.0088) (0.0127) (0.0123) (0.0144) (0.0224) (0.0139) (0.0199)
Obese (d) 0.0328∗∗∗ 0.0177 0.0372∗∗ 0.0110 0.0406 0.0351∗ 0.0347
(0.0096) (0.0139) (0.0137) (0.0160) (0.0239) (0.0160) (0.0227)
Observations 34342 16854 17488 10828 5122 11146 5340
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ (p < 0.05), ∗∗ (p < 0.01), ∗∗∗ (p < 0.001)
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Controls for whether R has children, having children*female, marital status, age, age2, education
AFQT score, type of residence, and year dummies are included in all regressions.
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Table 3.11: Effect of Living in the Region with the Highest BMI on Log Wages: Females, Males, and White
Females
Effect on Log Wages
Females Males White Females
High BMI Region 0.1641∗∗∗ 0.1409∗∗∗ 0.1459∗∗∗ 0.0377∗ 0.1670∗∗∗ 0.1591∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.0220) (0.0121) (0.0226) (0.0140) (0.0257)
Obese -0.6653∗∗∗ -0.4540∗∗ 0.1604 0.4720∗∗ -0.7617∗∗∗ -0.5998∗∗
(0.2218) (0.2137) (0.2021) (0.1922) (0.2811) (0.2691)
RegionBMI*Obese 0.0198∗∗ 0.0158∗∗ -0.0069 -0.0166∗∗ 0.0228∗∗ 0.0208∗∗
(0.0081) (0.0078) (0.0075) (0.0071) (0.0103) (0.0098)
Observations 38405 38405 34954 34954 25317 25317
r2 0.3235 0.6128 0.3965 0.6899 0.3103 0.6068
Standard errors in parentheses
Even numbered columns have person-specific fixed effects included∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.12: Effect of Living in the Region with the Highest BMI on Log Wages: Black Females, White
Males, and Black Males
Effect on Log Wages
Black Females White Males Black Males
High BMI Region 0.1559∗∗∗ 0.0488 0.1558∗∗∗ 0.0685∗∗∗ 0.1411∗∗∗ 0.0109
(0.0160) (0.0316) (0.0136) (0.0226) (0.0167) (0.0313)
Obese -0.6653∗∗∗ -0.4540∗∗ 0.1604 0.4720∗∗ -0.7617∗∗∗ -0.5998∗∗
(0.2549) (0.2773) (0.2280) (0.2113) (0.2843) (0.2965)
RegionBMI*Obese 0.0198∗∗ 0.0116 -0.0137 -0.0222∗∗∗ 0.0229∗∗ 0.0194∗
(0.0095) (0.0103) (0.0084) (0.0077) (0.0104) (0.0108))
Observations 10964 10964 27632 27632 11471 11471
r2 0.4176 0.6510 0.3835 0.6787 0.3774 0.6638
Standard errors in parentheses
Even numbered columns have person-specific fixed effects included∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.13: Effect of living in the Region with the Highest BMI on Employment
Effect on Probability of Employment
Females Males White Females Black Females White Males Black Males
High BMI Region 0.0154 -0.2355∗∗∗ 0.0178 0.0714 -0.3166∗∗∗ -0.0402
(0.0311) (0.0402) (0.0367) (0.0498) (0.0506) (0.0559)
Obese -2.1607∗∗∗ -1.0907 -2.4546∗∗∗ -0.3058 -1.4891 -0.1913
(0.5188) (0.7450) (0.6605) (0.7498) (0.9878) (1.0069)
RegionBMI*Obese 0.0787∗∗∗ 0.0390 0.0884∗∗∗ 0.0130 0.0518 0.0103
(0.0188) (0.0266) (0.0239) (0.0275) (0.0350) (0.0359)
Observations 46759 38283 30409 13693 29444 13354
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.14: Regional Effects of Obesity on Log Wages (All Females, All Males, White Females)
Effect on Log Wages
Females Males White Females
Percent Obese in Region 3.0772∗∗∗ 2.1489∗∗∗ 2.8368∗∗∗ 1.1432∗∗∗ 3.1396∗∗∗ 2.4507∗∗∗
(0.2226) (0.3442) (0.2319) (0.3684) (0.2626) (0.4037)
Obese -0.1878∗∗∗ -0.0755∗ 0.0120 0.0881∗∗ -0.2110∗∗∗ -0.1023∗∗
(0.0376) (0.0386) (0.0349) (0.0352) (0.0480) (0.0491)
Percent Obese*Obese 0.2836∗ 0.2129 -0.1795 -0.2997∗∗ 0.3414∗ 0.2995∗
(0.1460) (0.1393) (0.1367) (0.1270) (0.1860) (0.1764)
Observations 38142 38142 34672 34672 25158 25158
r2 0.3345 0.6142 0.4061 0.6908 0.3210 0.6080
Standard errors in parentheses
Even numbered columns have person-specific fixed effects included∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.15: Regional Effects of Obesity on Log Wages (Black Females, White Males, Black Males)
Effect on Log Wages
Black Females White Males Black Males
Percent Obese in Region 2.9021∗∗∗ 0.5360 2.9807∗∗∗ 1.4846∗∗∗ 2.8317∗∗∗ 0.8048
(0.2721) (0.5247) (0.2584) (0.3560) (0.2919) (0.4933)
Obese -0.1148∗∗∗ -0.0197 0.0360 0.1216∗∗∗ -0.0362 -0.0387
(0.0432) (0.0501) (0.0409) (0.0398) (0.0520) (0.0552)
Percent Obese*Obese 0.2385 0.1805 -0.3557∗∗ -0.4485∗∗∗ 0.3598∗ 0.3296∗
(0.1679) (0.1798) (0.1578) (0.1410) (0.1839) (0.1868)
Observations 10903 10903 27426 27426 11413 11413
r2 0.4293 0.6529 0.3911 0.6792 0.3921 0.6645
Standard errors in parentheses
Even numbered columns have person-specific fixed effects included∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.16: Regional Effects of Obesity of Employment
Effect on Probability of Employment
Females Males White Females Black Females White Males Black Males
Percent Obese in Region 0.2215 -4.3611∗∗∗ 0.2713 0.9171 -5.0455∗∗∗ -0.8713
(0.5722) (0.7235) (0.6752) (0.9182) (0.8728) (1.0227)
Obese -0.3551∗∗∗ -0.1984 -0.4348∗∗∗ 0.0437 -0.2516 0.0886
(0.0959) (0.1357) (0.1229) (0.1379) (0.1802) (0.1945)
Percent Obese*Obese 1.4278∗∗∗ 0.7055 1.6459∗∗∗ 0.0312 0.7560 0.0385
(0.3501) (0.4625) (0.4469) (0.5124) (0.6027) (0.6281)
Observations 46751 38274 30404 13692 29437 13353
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.17: Regional Effects of Obesity on Log Wages (All Females, All Males, White Females): Year by
Region Fixed Effects
Effect on Log Wages
Females Males White Females
Underweight 0.0032 -0.0215 -0.1181 -0.0437 0.0064 -0.0220
(0.0271) (0.0313) (0.0963) (0.0836) (0.0295) (0.0341)
Overweight -0.0320∗∗ 0.0133 0.0223∗ 0.0256∗ -0.0342∗∗ 0.0114
(0.0138) (0.0141) (0.0133) (0.0137) (0.0158) (0.0163)
Obese -0.1867∗∗∗ -0.0794∗∗ 0.0216 0.0916∗∗∗ -0.2084∗∗∗ -0.1048∗∗
(0.0383) (0.0392) (0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0487) (0.0497)
Percent Obese*Obese 0.2759∗ 0.2110 -0.2179 -0.3146∗∗ 0.3260∗ 0.2864
(0.1494) (0.1416) (0.1378) (0.1274) (0.1894) (0.1787)
Observations 38142 38142 34672 34672 25158 25158
r2 0.3400 0.6201 0.4080 0.6926 0.3273 0.6149
Standard errors in parentheses
Even numbered columns have person-specific fixed effects included∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.18: Regional Effects of Obesity on Log Wages (Black Females, White Males, Black Males): Year by
Region Fixed Effects
Effect on Log Wages
Black Females White Males Black Males
Underweight -0.0421 -0.0445 -0.1532 -0.0456 -0.0822 -0.0549
(0.0613) (0.0545) (0.1044) (0.0687) (0.0964) (0.1423)
Overweight 0.0169 0.0543∗∗∗ 0.0160 0.0210 0.0366∗∗ 0.0287
(0.0191) (0.0207) (0.0154) (0.0145) (0.0184) (0.0201)
Obese -0.1044∗∗ -0.0131 0.0455 0.1287∗∗∗ -0.0250 -0.0321
(0.0436) (0.0502) (0.0413) (0.0397) (0.0521) (0.0562)
Percent Obese*Obese 0.2009 0.1624 -0.3944∗∗ -0.4763∗∗∗ 0.3193∗ 0.3057
(0.1688) (0.1783) (0.1592) (0.1412) (0.1842) (0.1875)
Observations 10903 10903 27426 27426 11413 11413
r2 0.4348 0.6573 0.3933 0.6811 0.3968 0.6683
Standard errors in parentheses
Even numbered columns have person-specific fixed effects included∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.19: Regional Effects of Obesity of Employment: Year by Region Fixed Effects
Effect on Probability of Employment
Females Males White Females Black Females White Males Black Males
Underweight -0.2405∗∗∗ -0.7257∗∗∗ -0.2326∗∗ -0.4530∗∗∗ -0.8191∗∗∗ -0.5312
(0.0825) (0.2254) (0.0925) (0.1462) (0.2819) (0.3492)
Overweight 0.0789∗∗ 0.0271 0.0659∗ 0.1512∗∗∗ -0.0350 0.1749∗∗∗
(0.0331) (0.0406) (0.0383) (0.0505) (0.0503) (0.0568)
Obese -0.3945∗∗∗ -0.2412∗ -0.4658∗∗∗ 0.0185 -0.3087∗ 0.0511
(0.0939) (0.1316) (0.1201) (0.1357) (0.1741) (0.1903)
Percent Obese*Obese 1.5766∗∗∗ 0.8523∗ 1.7617∗∗∗ 0.1414 0.9434 0.1733
(0.3427) (0.4465) (0.4357) (0.5004) (0.5769) (0.6116)
Observations 46751 38274 30404 13692 29437 13353
r2
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Effects of Obesity for other Sub-samples
Table 3.20: Log Wage Regressions of Full Sample, Males, and Females 1989-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Full Sample Males Females
BMI -0.0051*** -0.0007 -0.0026 0.0000 -0.0080*** -0.0005
(0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0016)
BMI (lag) -0.0047*** -0.0032 -0.0076***
(0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0014)
Weight (in pounds) -0.0007*** -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0013*** -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Weight (lag) -0.0007*** -0.0005 -0.0013***
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Underweight -0.0061 -0.0159 -0.1176 -0.0405 -0.0113 -0.0192
(0.0268) (0.0288) (0.0920) (0.0637) (0.0271) (0.0319)
Overweight 0.0044 0.0193* 0.0251 0.0264* -0.0297* 0.0141
(0.0096) (0.0092) (0.0133) (0.0125) (0.0136) (0.0136)
Obese -0.0621*** -0.0031 -0.0319 0.0112 -0.1117*** -0.0166
(0.0116) (0.0135) (0.0167) (0.0179) (0.0157) (0.0201)
Underweight (lag) 0.0570 0.0143 0.0362
(0.0331) (0.1092) (0.0353)
Overweight (lag) -0.0053 0.0129 -0.0526**
(0.0123) (0.0163) (0.0181)
Obese (lag) -0.0593*** -0.0499* -0.0947***
(0.0146) (0.0208) (0.0203)
Observations 77884 38767 77884 40278 19755 40278 37606 19012 37606
Standard errors in parentheses, * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001)
One of the three measures of weight is used: BMI, weight (controlling for height) or the three indicators
Column (2) (5) (7) use lagged weight measures, Columns (3) (6) and (9) include individual fixed-effects
Controls for whether R has children, having children*female, marital status, age, age2, education, firm size,
job tenure, AFQT score, type of residence, industry, occupation, and year dummies are included in all regressions.
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Table 3.21: Log Wage Regressions of White Males and Black Males 1989-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
White Males Black Males
BMI -0.0041* -0.0009 0.0047* 0.0049
(0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0032)
BMI (lag) -0.0048* 0.0050
(0.0021) (0.0027)
Weight (in pounds) -0.0006* -0.0001 0.0007* 0.0007
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Weight (lag) -0.0007* 0.0007
(0.0003) (0.0004)
Underweight -0.1355 -0.0520 -0.0621 -0.0328
(0.1027) (0.0684) (0.0908) (0.1428)
Overweight 0.0225 0.0261 0.0413* 0.0260
(0.0153) (0.0145) (0.0180) (0.0201)
Obese -0.0516** 0.0023 0.0671** 0.0518
(0.0194) (0.0211) (0.0234) (0.0293)
Underweight (lag) 0.0101 -0.0317
(0.1184) (0.0636)
Overweight (lag) 0.0091 0.0308
(0.0188) (0.0217)
Obese (lag) -0.0719** 0.0542
(0.0243) (0.0310)
Observations 26981 13069 26981 11204 5681 11204
Standard errors in parentheses, * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001)
One of the three measures of weight is used: BMI, weight (controlling for height) or the three indicators
Column (2) (5) use lagged weight measures, Columns (3) (6) include individual fixed-effects
Controls for whether R has children, having children*female, marital status, age, age2, education, firm size,
job tenure, AFQT score, type of residence, industry, occupation, and year dummies are included in all regressions.
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Table 3.22: Log Wage Regressions of Full Sample, Males, and Females 1989-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Full Sample Males Females
BMI -0.0056*** -0.0011 -0.0023 0.0021 -0.0089*** -0.0030
(0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0011) (0.0019)
BMI (lag) -0.0055*** -0.0029 -0.0090***
(0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0016)
Weight (in pounds) -0.0008*** -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0015*** -0.0005
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Weight (lag) -0.0008*** -0.0004 -0.0015***
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Underweight -0.0114 -0.0386 -0.1089 -0.0483 -0.0112 -0.0369
(0.0281) (0.0322) (0.0976) (0.0840) (0.0282) (0.0348)
Overweight -0.0043 0.0044 0.0184 0.0198 -0.0439*** -0.0124
(0.0093) (0.0098) (0.0127) (0.0136) (0.0132) (0.0140)
Obese -0.0751*** -0.0241 -0.0353* 0.0056 -0.1334*** -0.0551**
(0.0116) (0.0145) (0.0165) (0.0199) (0.0155) (0.0209)
Underweight (lag) 0.0128 0.0053 -0.0017
(0.0407) (0.1377) (0.0395)
Overweight (lag) -0.0109 0.0109 -0.0636***
(0.0128) (0.0168) (0.0191)
Obese (lag) -0.0656*** -0.0425 -0.1163***
(0.0162) (0.0228) (0.0230)
Observations 56684 17881 56684 29734 9343 29734 26950 8538 26950
Standard errors in parentheses, * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001)
One of the three measures of weight is used: BMI, weight (controlling for height) or the three indicators
Column (2) (5) (7) use lagged weight measures, Columns (3) (6) and (9) include individual fixed-effects
Controls for whether R has children, having children*female, marital status, age, age2, education, firm size,
job tenure, AFQT score, type of residence, industry, occupation, and year dummies are included in all regressions.
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Table 3.23: Log Wage Regressions of White Males and Black Males 1989-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
White Males Black Males
BMI -0.0036* 0.0017 0.0040 0.0042
(0.0017) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0037)
BMI (lag) -0.0048* 0.0068*
(0.0023) (0.0031)
Weight (in pounds) -0.0005* 0.0002 0.0006* 0.0005
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Weight (lag) -0.0006* 0.0010*
(0.0003) (0.0005)
Underweight -0.1285 -0.0616 -0.0554 -0.0610
(0.1071) (0.0891) (0.1154) (0.2140)
Overweight 0.0160 0.0231 0.0321 -0.0000
(0.0146) (0.0159) (0.0198) (0.0206)
Obese -0.0540** -0.0007 0.0539* 0.0371
(0.0193) (0.0234) (0.0252) (0.0307)
Underweight (lag) -0.0044 0.0546
(0.1482) (0.0878)
Overweight (lag) 0.0023 0.0488
(0.0194) (0.0257)
Obese (lag) -0.0647* 0.0718
(0.0267) (0.0368)
Observations 20066 6231 20066 8115 2637 8115
Standard errors in parentheses, * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001)
One of the three measures of weight is used: BMI, weight (controlling for height) or the three indicators
Column (2) (5) use lagged weight measures, Columns (3) (6) include individual fixed-effects
Controls for whether R has children, having children*female, marital status, age, age2, education, firm size,
job tenure, AFQT score, type of residence, industry, occupation, and year dummies are included in all regressions.
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Table 3.24: Log Wage Regressions of Full Sample, Males, and Females 2002-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Full Sample Males Females
BMI -0.0039** 0.0017 -0.0030 0.0025 -0.0064*** 0.0010
(0.0012) (0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0045) (0.0015) (0.0033)
BMI (lag) -0.0039** -0.0030 -0.0066***
(0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0018)
Weight (in pounds) -0.0006** 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0011*** 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Weight (lag) -0.0006** -0.0005 -0.0011***
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Underweight -0.0000 0.0703 -0.2495* -0.1092 -0.0066 0.0909
(0.0578) (0.0944) (0.1223) (0.2019) (0.0624) (0.0996)
Overweight 0.0286 0.0367 0.0431 0.0402 0.0025 0.0335
(0.0191) (0.0275) (0.0274) (0.0433) (0.0263) (0.0356)
Obese -0.0321 0.0106 -0.0184 0.0135 -0.0701** 0.0037
(0.0195) (0.0326) (0.0289) (0.0501) (0.0260) (0.0441)
Underweight (lag) 0.0973* 0.0010 0.0722
(0.0423) (0.1003) (0.0490)
Overweight (lag) 0.0008 0.0169 -0.0406
(0.0168) (0.0226) (0.0246)
Obese (lag) -0.0524** -0.0517 -0.0829**
(0.0186) (0.0271) (0.0254)
Observations 21200 20886 21200 10544 10412 10544 10656 10474 10656
Standard errors in parentheses, * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001)
One of the three measures of weight is used: BMI, weight (controlling for height) or the three indicators
Column (2) (5) (7) use lagged weight measures, Columns (3) (6) and (9) include individual fixed-effects
Controls for whether R has children, having children*female, marital status, age, age2, education, firm size,
job tenure, AFQT score, type of residence, industry, occupation, and year dummies are included in all regressions.
Table 3.25: Log Wage Regressions of White Males and Black Males 2002-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
White Males Black Males
BMI -0.0046* 0.0028 0.0052 0.0013
(0.0023) (0.0054) (0.0033) (0.0067)
BMI (lag) -0.0045 0.0035
(0.0025) (0.0034)
Weight (in pounds) -0.0007* 0.0004 0.0007 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0010)
Weight (lag) -0.0007 0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0005)
Underweight -0.3209* -0.2182 -0.0415 0.1237
(0.1551) (0.2453) (0.0789) (0.0937)
Overweight 0.0380 0.0368 0.0665* 0.0448
(0.0316) (0.0508) (0.0304) (0.0578)
Obese -0.0405 0.0037 0.0925** 0.0335
(0.0333) (0.0589) (0.0347) (0.0760)
Underweight (lag) 0.0043 -0.1408
(0.1068) (0.0829)
Overweight (lag) 0.0169 0.0082
(0.0262) (0.0293)
Obese (lag) -0.0727* 0.0364
(0.0318) (0.0381)
Observations 6915 6838 6915 3089 3044 3089
Standard errors in parentheses, * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001)
One of the three measures of weight is used: BMI, weight (controlling for height) or the three indicators
Column (2) (5) use lagged weight measures, Columns (3) (6) include individual fixed-effects
Controls for whether R has children, having children*female, marital status, age, age2, education, firm size,
job tenure, AFQT score, type of residence, industry, occupation, and year dummies are included in all regressions.
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3.6.2 Additional Specifications: Probability of Employment
We redefine the definition of “employed” to be those who work full-time, i.e. at least 7 hours per day,
and estimate the probability of being employed. The results are presented in table 3.B.1-B.3 and differ in
a couple ways to those in Tables 6-8. First, the coefficient on overweight white males is insignificant, and
second, the coefficient on obese white females is now insignificant as well. While the point estimate for the
coefficient for overweight white males is similar to that in table 3.5, the coefficient for obese white females
is much smaller than before. This means that the employment penalty for being heavier is concentrated
in “part-time” jobs, or jobs where one works less than 7 hours per day. (Need to change to reflect actual
results).
In addition, we split these results for years before 2000 and after 2000 and reestimate to see if the
employment probability has changed over time.
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Table 3.26: Probability of Full-time Employment 1989-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full Sample Males Females White Males Black Males White Females Black Females
Underweight (d) -0.0986*** -0.2496** -0.0762** -0.2671** -0.1858 -0.0755* -0.1375**
(0.0266) (0.0894) (0.0285) (0.1018) (0.1361) (0.0313) (0.0519)
Overweight (d) 0.0214*** 0.0075 0.0225* 0.0012 0.0441** 0.0164 0.0555***
(0.0062) (0.0065) (0.0106) (0.0073) (0.0143) (0.0124) (0.0154)
Obese (d) 0.0204** 0.0050 0.0199 -0.0003 0.0268 0.0152 0.0305
(0.0078) (0.0084) (0.0129) (0.0096) (0.0184) (0.0156) (0.0191)
Observations 91998 45239 46759 29444 13354 30409 13693
Standard errors in parentheses,* (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001)
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Controls for whether R has children, having children*female, marital status, age, age2, education
AFQT score, type of residence, and year dummies are included in all regressions.
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Table 3.27: Probability of Full-time Employment 1989-1998
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full Sample Males Females White Males Black Males White Females Black Females
Underweight (d) -0.0674* -0.2006* -0.0536 -0.2016* -0.1699 -0.0481 -0.1400*
(0.0264) (0.0906) (0.0284) (0.0978) (0.1441) (0.0310) (0.0579)
Overweight (d) 0.0115 0.0050 0.0019 0.0001 0.0376** -0.0015 0.0363*
(0.0064) (0.0055) (0.0122) (0.0060) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0182)
Obese (d) -0.0009 -0.0105 -0.0076 -0.0140 0.0030 -0.0161 0.0218
(0.0085) (0.0083) (0.0148) (0.0095) (0.0207) (0.0184) (0.0212)
Observations 57656 28385 29271 18616 8232 19263 8353
Standard errors in parentheses, * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001)
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Controls for whether R has children, having children*female, marital status, age, age2, education
AFQT score, type of residence, and year dummies are included in all regressions.
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Table 3.28: Probability of Full-time Employment 2000-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full Sample Males Females White Males Black Males White Females Black Females
Underweight (d) -0.1657*** -0.3648** -0.1474** -0.4212** -0.2243 -0.1567** -0.1435
(0.0459) (0.1132) (0.0494) (0.1433) (0.1492) (0.0540) (0.0950)
Overweight (d) 0.0412*** 0.0141 0.0544*** 0.0060 0.0558* 0.0428* 0.0933***
(0.0101) (0.0136) (0.0150) (0.0154) (0.0241) (0.0171) (0.0245)
Obese (d) 0.0499*** 0.0248 0.0533** 0.0174 0.0526* 0.0506* 0.0538*
(0.0111) (0.0149) (0.0168) (0.0172) (0.0263) (0.0198) (0.0272)
Observations 34342 16854 17488 10828 5122 11146 5340
Standard errors in parentheses, * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001)
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Controls for whether R has children, having children*female, marital status, age, age2, education
AFQT score, type of residence, and year dummies are included in all regressions.
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3.6.3 NLSY States by Region
Table 3.29: NLSY States by Region
Region 1: ’Northeast’ Region 2: ’North Central’
Connecticut Illinois
Maine Indiana
Massachusetts Iowa
New Hampshire Kansas
New Jersey Michigan
New York Minnesota
Pennsylvania Missouri
Rhode Island Nebraska
Vermont North Dakota
Ohio
South Dakota
Wisconsin
Region 3: ’South’ Region 4: ’West’
Alabama Alaska
Arkansas Arizona
Delaware California
District of Columbia Colorado
Florida Hawaii
Georgia Idaho
Kentucky Montana
Louisiana Nevada
Maryland New Mexico
Mississippi Oregon
North Carolina Utah
Oklahoma Washington
South Carolina Wyoming
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
West Virginia
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